[Buddha-l] Are we sick of dogma yet? (2nd of 2)

[Richard Hayes]

On Mon, 2006-11-27 at 17:55 +0000, L.S. Cousins wrote:
>  

> He adopts the
> >standard terminology from analytic philosophy, specifically philosophy
> >of mind, where "reductionism" is not a loaded term at all. It is meant
> >to be descriptive of a particular stance.
> 
> It might not bother me in a philosophical context, but elsewhere the 
> connotations seem very strong and over-stated.

That's true. It's interesting how discipline-specific many terms are. In
religious studies,for example, one speaks of a religious cult with no
negative connotations at all. In ordinary language, however, calling
anything a religious cult is usually disparaging it.

I should add one further point about Siderits's agenda. Analytic
philosophy has an earned reputation for being parochial and unwilling to
take anything seriously that does not fall within a culturally and
attitudinally narrow purview. Siderits has been trying for years to
broaden the horizons of Anglo-American philosophers by showing them that
Indians (and other philosophers before who lived before Bertrand
Russell) had things to say of genuine philosophical interest.

> For Advaita, Aatman is the only reality; so it cannot be 'one of the 
> ultimately real constituents of the world'. 

Well, yes, it can. If it is the only ultimate reality, then it is surely
one of the real constituents of the world. It's just that the real
constituents of the world have a cardinality of one. The important point
is that aatman is not explained away and survives the cut when false
things are eliminated. It's in that sense that advaitins are realists
about the self.

> For Saam.khya, I don't 
> think that Purus.a is held to be such a constituent either - it is an 
> illusion that it appears so. When Prakr.ti is seen, she disappears 
> like a shy dancer - if I remember correctly.

Prak.rti does not cease to exist, as I understand it. It remains one of
the ultimate realities, as does puru.sa. What disappears is the false
belief that prak.rti is conscious and that puru.sa is suffering.

> 
> >  > >This view of the self is non-reductive
> >>  >in that it regards self as a subject that bears predicates that cannot
> >>  >be borne by any of the aggregates.
> >>
> >>  And they are ?
> >
> >The ability to be perceived by ALL the senses (something that no dharma
> >can claim)
> 
> I don't understand this.

Visible dharmas can be seen by the eye, sounds can be heard by the ear,
etc, but no dharma can be perceived through more than one external
sense. But the person that is supervenient on the dharmas can be seen,
heard, touched, smelled and (if one is prepared to be socially rude)
tasted. So the person can take this one predicate that no sensible
dharma can take.

> If the pudgala is the vehicle of karma,  what is its vehicle :-)

A chariot, I should think. Not one of those deconstructible chariots
that Naagasena was selling, but an ultimatey real chariot.

> >It's one advantage is that it has currency among analytic philosophers.
> >What is needed is a terminology that is both adequately descriptive and
> >accessible to non-philosophers. Any suggestions?
> 
> Stick to what the Personalists actually say. It is a lot easier to understand.

It is not necessarily a virtue for a theory to be easy to understand by
a non-specialist. Supervenience is actually quite easy to understand if
one is willing to bear with it for a bit, and I do think interpreting
the writings of the Personalists in a way that clarifies just how they
differed from other Buddhists is an advance in understanding. I don't
see much advantage in freezing terminology and theory at one period of
time, especially if one is interested in showing that there were people
two thousand years ago saying things that are still of value to us
today, not only to people living in a different conceptual universe from
ours.

> >I have no fixed idea at all about the relationship of the mental and the
> >physical. Just about every view I have seen has strengths and
> >weaknesses. So I doubt I have ever espoused the view you mention, but I
> >have wondered what Buddhism might look like to someone who does espouse
> >that view. That issue aside, the stance you refer to can be see in (at
> >least) two ways. 1) One can see the mental as essentially a shorthand
> >way of referring to brain states---this is the reductionist view.
> 
> And this is exactly why I am unhappy with characterizing Vaibhaas.ika 
> and many other early Buddhist schools as 'reductionist' - they are 
> not at all reductionist in _this_ sense. It's bound to lead to 
> confusion.

It need not lead to confusion if one is careful in what one says. A
philosopher can be a reductionist about persons but not at all a
reductionist about minds. Reductionism is not an absolute term; it is a
relational term, so one needs to specify what is being reduced to what
by a reductionist. This Siderits has been careful to do.

> True enough, except that such a theory might easily get in the way of 
> the practice. So it would need a certain care not to confuse one with 
> the other.

Of course a theory CAN get in the way of practice. So can a physical
disease. But theorizing does not NECESSARILY get in the way of practice.
Indeed, like a physical disease, a theory can actually enhance one's
practice. As you say, care is required. That some people are not careful
drivers is no reason to abolish automobiles. That some people are
carelessly attached to theories is no reason to abolish theorizing. If a
theory is helpful to anyone, then I'm for welcoming it. I think
Siderits's way of talking about various Buddhist theories of anaatman
could actually be quite helpful to some practitioners, but I have not
yet had a chance to test it out.

> I don't have any problem with that. I would accept that theory is an 
> important part of doing practice. But it can become a prison at times.

No doubt about it. But even prisons can become prisons at times to some
people; to others a prison is a vihaara.

> >I can see your answer the the question "Are we sick of dogma yet?" is
> >No.
> 
> That's neatly ambiguous, since dogma is a word that simply means 
> 'teaching' but is often used to refer to doctrines or ideas that are 
> held in an unthinking or rigid way.

It is obviously in that sense of the word "dogma" that I ask "Are we
sick of dogma yet?" More than a little Buddhist teachings are dogmas in
just that sense. That's why I welcome people like Siderits who help some
people (I being one of them) see old teachings in new light and enable
people to rethink basic principles rather than merely repeat them.


>  Both in modern philosophy and in 
> Buddhism there is sometimes a tendency to fixate on over-simplified 
> understandings. And in both there is a rather frequent tendency to 
> attack other people's over-simplified understandings.

Yes. That is a lamentable tendency that some of us have dedicated our
entire lives to helping to eradicate. Nothing much good comes of
attacking; a great deal of good can come from questioning and from
seeking ways of keeping useful teachings fresh and alive.

> But in the present context, you can have opinions or dogmas about 
> no-self, but that is not at all the same thing as contemplating 
> no-self, etc. Disenchantment is certainly mentioned in the texts. So 
> is loving-kindness. To that extent they are both dogmas. But the 
> experience of them is not a dogma. Not so many people get sick of 
> loving-kindness. I suppose rather more get sick of disenchantment.

Any experience can become the basis of rigidity if one cannot (or will
not) let it go. So if one becomes so habituated (and attached) to
disenchantment that one can no longer enjoy temporary flights of
enchantment, then one's rigidity may become an obstacle to the reduction
(or elimination) of the causes of dukkha. Speaking only for myself, I am
inclined to think that nearly everything improved in my practice once I
allowed myself to become disenchanted with disenchantment. It was
becoming something of a prison for me.

-- 
Richard Hayes
Department of Philosophy
University of New Mexico
http://www.unm.edu/~rhayes