[Buddha-l] Pudgalavada #1

[Dan Lusthaus]

Though only a tiny portion of their much vaster literature has survived, we are fortunate to have two Chinese translations of what, at its core, was a single text. These are:

1. T.25.1506. Sanfa du lun ("Three Dharmas Paramita Treatise," a
Vaatsiputriiya text) authored by Vasubhadra, translated by Gautama
Saṅghadeva in 391.
2. T.25.1505 Si ahanmu chao jie ("Commentary on the four Agamas"),
translated by Kumārabuddhi in 382

Both Chinese renderings -- as is unfortunately the case for many pre-sixth century Chinese Buddhist translations -- are difficult texts, with many problematic passages. These two versions also greatly differ from each other in wording, phrasing, semantic implications, etc., with one or the other expanding at certain points with extended passages entirely absent from the other version.

I will offer a translation of an ostensible parallel passage from both versions. Priestley also translated both passages (pp. 56-60), though, as a comparison between our respective versions will quickly show, we read them quite differently. Since both texts present all sorts of difficulties, it would be silly for either Priestley or me to claim either of us has definitively deciphered everything perfectly. Since Stephen H. enjoys correcting some of my Chinese translations, I invite him (or anyone else with the language ability) to offer whatever corrections, comments, suggestions, or critiques seem relevant.

Before giving the translations, some brief comments.

As I've mentioned, for the Pudgalavadins, the pudgala ("person") is not a real substantial thing (pace certain attempted non-reductionists), but explicitly and repeatedly said to be a "praj~napti". Prajnapti can mean several different things, and one of the interesting and useful aspects of these two texts is that each renders prajnapti into Chinese using a different term, each term suggesting a different (but somewhat overlapping) sense of what prajnapti means. 

T.1506, the shorter version of this passage, uses 施設 shishe "gives a linguistic set up, establishes, organizes", i.e., prajñapti as *nominalization*. Sheshe did become one of the standard Chinese equivalents for prajnapti.

T. 1505, which offers a much longer and more detailed version of the passage (that includes interpolated glosses on certain terms by the famous exegete, Dao'an), uses a term that is more unusual for prajnapti: 教授 jiaoshou "instruct, teach, impart the teachings," a teaching device, i.e., prajñapti as *heuristic*.

T.1505 also uses several terms that, unlike their typical use in most other Buddhist texts, in this text are to be taken in their literary meanings:
方便 fangbie is usually the standard Chinese term for upaaya (expedient means), but here is used in another of its Chinese senses: "metaphorical device".
比 bi, which usually means "comparison," etc., here means "figure of speech."

These passages are also one of the places where both texts discuss the so-called "inexpressible" (bukeshou, bushou). Actually, as I read them, they are not so much extolling something ineffable, as accusing other Buddhists of concealing hidden assumptions by "not saying" what is implicit in typical Buddhist phraseology. As you'll see, they accuse anyone who takes these metaphoric prajnaptis as literal statements of being "stupid" and "lacking intelligence."

Both passages discuss three types of prajnapti, but differ somewhat in the name of the second prajnapti. The shorter version names them: prajnapti of appropriation (that is the appropriator of the skandhas, dhatus and ayatanas), prajnapti of the past, and prajnapti of cessation. The longer version calls the second prajnapti "heuristics by metaphorical devices," and in its discussion of this -- which is much more detailed than what is provided by the shorter text -- discusses the "three times," i.e., past, present and future. In brief, the three prajnaptis concern (1) that which appropriates skandhas, etc., the jiva, or notion of a continuous entity and its relation to the body, sensation, etc.; (2) the temporalizing of that from life to life, or life-phase to life-phase; and (3) what, if anything "ceases" with parinirvana.

Priestley entirely ignores the material these passages are sandwiched between. That material reinforces that the "not-said" refers to unwarrented hidden assumptions, not a glorified ineffability, but, since the passage itself makes that clear enough, I will not translate the surrounding material either. Priestley's lead-in to the passage is another passage, from Bhavaviveka, which explicitly states that the "appropriator" of the skandhas of appropriation (i.e., the pudgala) is a prajnapti. Priestley claims to be confused by this. Discussing the content of the shorter passage, after providing his own translation, he says (p. 57):

"Finally, the last paragraph explains how these concepts preclude various wrong views concerning the person: the familiar 'two extremes' of annihilation and permanence, but also the opinions that it does not exist and that it exists. Since the position of the Pudgalavada is surely that the pudgala does exist, the statement here that conception [=prajnapti] according to non-appropriation precludes its existence is a little puzzling."

Actually, the statement is sufficiently clear. What is puzzling is why Priestley insists that their position is that the pudgala "surely" exists, despite their explicit disclaimer.

Finally, whatever is in parentheses in the following translation is actually in the Taisho text. They are Dao'an's glosses. The Chinese is very terse and needs some filling in so as to be understandable in English. I have placed all such additions in square brackets.

Translations in next message.

Dan Lusthaus
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