[Buddha-l] Are we sick of dogma yet? (2nd of 2)

[L.S. Cousins]

Richard,

>Siderits's agenda is to find ways of describing various attitudes to the
>reality of the self/person. He reckons that pudgalavaadins and
>Vaibhaa.sikas had different views, or at least thought they did, so we
>seeks terminology that might capture their differences. He adopts the
>standard terminology from analytic philosophy, specifically philosophy
>of mind, where "reductionism" is not a loaded term at all. It is meant
>to be descriptive of a particular stance.

It might not bother me in a philosophical context, but elsewhere the 
connotations seem very strong and over-stated.

>  > >3. Realism would be the view that the self is fully real in that there
>  > >are predicates that apply to it but that cannot be applied to anything
>>  >else. The self is one of the ultimately real constituents of the world,
>>  >and it would therefore be an intellectual mistake to eliminate it or to
>>  >see it as merely a convenient fiction.
>  >
>>  I do not understand how either Saam.khya or Advaita Vedaanta could be
>>  described as realist in this sense.
>
>This puzzles me. Surely, both systems accept that aatman (or puru.sa) is
>fully real and not a mere term of convenience.

For Advaita, Aatman is the only reality; so it cannot be 'one of the 
ultimately real constituents of the world'. For Saam.khya, I don't 
think that Purus.a is held to be such a constituent either - it is an 
illusion that it appears so. When Prakr.ti is seen, she disappears 
like a shy dancer - if I remember correctly.

>  > >This view of the self is non-reductive
>>  >in that it regards self as a subject that bears predicates that cannot
>>  >be borne by any of the aggregates.
>>
>>  And they are ?
>
>The ability to be perceived by ALL the senses (something that no dharma
>can claim)

I don't understand this.

>and the ability to be an enduring vehicle of unripened karma.

If the pudgala is the vehicle of karma,  what is its vehicle :-)

>  > I would have thought that the whole trend in e.g. neurological and
>>  memory studies is precisely to see that what appears unified is in
>>  fact a complex of processes.
>
>About forty years ago that was true. Now it seems that various versions
>of supervenience theory, which recognize BOTH complexity and unity, are
>prevailing. If you are really interested take a look at the article on
>supervenience in the on-line Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy.

In American philosophy perhaps. But certainly not in scientific 
researches in the U.K.

>  > >By seeing the self as a supervenient reality we can
>>  >speak seriously, and without embarrassment or shame, about such things
>>  >as self-cultivation, self-improvement, self-awareness and
>>  >self-understanding,
>>
>>  While we can use such language, it seems to me that it often feeds
>>  egoistic aspects of personality which in fact stand in the way of
>>  cultivation.
>
>I'm not sure what kinds of observations would serve as evidence of that
>claim. It sounds to be like an essentially a priori claim of the sort
>that might be made by someone who is already committed to a particular
>dogma.

At which point discussion becomes impossible.

>It's one advantage is that it has currency among analytic philosophers.
>What is needed is a terminology that is both adequately descriptive and
>accessible to non-philosophers. Any suggestions?

Stick to what the Personalists actually say. It is a lot easier to understand.

>  > I would have thought such a view to be incompatible with the view
>>  that the mental is an emergent property of complex physical
>>  organization (which you sometimes espouse).
>
>I have no fixed idea at all about the relationship of the mental and the
>physical. Just about every view I have seen has strengths and
>weaknesses. So I doubt I have ever espoused the view you mention, but I
>have wondered what Buddhism might look like to someone who does espouse
>that view. That issue aside, the stance you refer to can be see in (at
>least) two ways. 1) One can see the mental as essentially a shorthand
>way of referring to brain states---this is the reductionist view.

And this is exactly why I am unhappy with characterizing Vaibhaas.ika 
and many other early Buddhist schools as 'reductionist' - they are 
not at all reductionist in _this_ sense. It's bound to lead to 
confusion.

>  > What we do have to bear in mind is that anatta / anaatman in Buddhism
>>  is a method of meditation, not a philosophical theory.
>
>There is no reason why a meditation method should not be made into a
>philosophical theory by people who like philosophical theories.

True enough, except that such a theory might easily get in the way of 
the practice. So it would need a certain care not to confuse one with 
the other.

>And for
>those who think it naive to think that any practice is theory-neutral,
>looking at theory is an inescapable part of doing practice. I suppose
>that may be part of the reason we have so many Indian Buddhist texts
>that could accurately be described as philosophical.

I don't have any problem with that. I would accept that theory is an 
important part of doing practice. But it can become a prison at times.

>  > Or, to put it another way the purpose of meditation on impermanence
>>  or unsatisfactoriness or no-self is to arouse disenchantment
>>  (nibbidaa) with what ever has enchanted the mind. Only after that can
>>  there be clear seeing.  Enchanted minds see only enchantments.
>
>I can see your answer the the question "Are we sick of dogma yet?" is
>No.

That's neatly ambiguous, since dogma is a word that simply means 
'teaching' but is often used to refer to doctrines or ideas that are 
held in an unthinking or rigid way. Both in modern philosophy and in 
Buddhism there is sometimes a tendency to fixate on over-simplified 
understandings. And in both there is a rather frequent tendency to 
attack other people's over-simplified understandings.

But in the present context, you can have opinions or dogmas about 
no-self, but that is not at all the same thing as contemplating 
no-self, etc. Disenchantment is certainly mentioned in the texts. So 
is loving-kindness. To that extent they are both dogmas. But the 
experience of them is not a dogma. Not so many people get sick of 
loving-kindness. I suppose rather more get sick of disenchantment.

Lance Cousins