[Buddha-l] Are we sick of dogma yet? (2nd of 2)

[Richard Hayes]

On Sun, 2006-11-26 at 08:42 +0000, L.S. Cousins wrote:

> >2. Reductionism would be the view that it makes sense to speak of a
> >self, but only insofar as "self" is a convenient shorthand for a complex
> >of phenomena that it would be cumbersome to mention in full detail. 
> <snip> 
> Siderits sees
> >much of early Buddhism (Theravada, Vaibhasika, Sautraantika etc) as
> >reductionist in this sense.
> 
> The list should surely include Madhyamaka and early Mahaayaana too ?

I'm not sure where Siderits places Madhyamaka. He, like Duerlinger,
seems to see Candrakirti as having a different stance than the earlier
schools.

> But I am curious as to Siderits's agenda. The use of the term 
> reductionism is so blatantly loaded (worthy of a Jesuit!) that I 
> wonder why it has been adopted.

Siderits's agenda is to find ways of describing various attitudes to the
reality of the self/person. He reckons that pudgalavaadins and
Vaibhaa.sikas had different views, or at least thought they did, so we
seeks terminology that might capture their differences. He adopts the
standard terminology from analytic philosophy, specifically philosophy
of mind, where "reductionism" is not a loaded term at all. It is meant
to be descriptive of a particular stance.

> 
> >3. Realism would be the view that the self is fully real in that there
> >are predicates that apply to it but that cannot be applied to anything
> >else. The self is one of the ultimately real constituents of the world,
> >and it would therefore be an intellectual mistake to eliminate it or to
> >see it as merely a convenient fiction.  
> 
> I do not understand how either Saam.khya or Advaita Vedaanta could be 
> described as realist in this sense.

This puzzles me. Surely, both systems accept that aatman (or puru.sa) is
fully real and not a mere term of convenience.


> >This view of the self is non-reductive
> >in that it regards self as a subject that bears predicates that cannot
> >be borne by any of the aggregates.
> 
> And they are ?

The ability to be perceived by ALL the senses (something that no dharma
can claim) and the ability to be an enduring vehicle of unripened karma.

> I suspect that this description has features that had never occurred 
> to any Pudgaslavaadin.

Yes, of course. Siderits is not attempting to be an historian. He is
attempting to use categories from analytic philosophy to make some sense
of problems discussed both by Indian Buddhists and by Western thinkers.
His audience is primarily contemporary philosophers, not historians of
ideas or specialists in Buddhist studies.

> I would have thought that the whole trend in e.g. neurological and 
> memory studies is precisely to see that what appears unified is in 
> fact a complex of processes.

About forty years ago that was true. Now it seems that various versions
of supervenience theory, which recognize BOTH complexity and unity, are
prevailing. If you are really interested take a look at the article on
supervenience in the on-line Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy.

> I am quite happy to wave depth psychology aside.

That is clearly a matter of taste and personal experience.

>  I do not see that 
> moral theory is possible with any kind of rigid self.

Exactly. That is why supervenience theory is attractive. The person as
seen by it anything but rigid.

> >By seeing the self as a supervenient reality we can
> >speak seriously, and without embarrassment or shame, about such things
> >as self-cultivation, self-improvement, self-awareness and
> >self-understanding,
> 
> While we can use such language, it seems to me that it often feeds 
> egoistic aspects of personality which in fact stand in the way of 
> cultivation.

I'm not sure what kinds of observations would serve as evidence of that
claim. It sounds to be like an essentially a priori claim of the sort
that might be made by someone who is already committed to a particular
dogma.

> >Although the terminology of non-reductive mereologial supervenience is
> >perhaps unnecessarily arcane,
> 
> Agreed

It's one advantage is that it has currency among analytic philosophers.
What is needed is a terminology that is both adequately descriptive and
accessible to non-philosophers. Any suggestions?

> I would have thought such a view to be incompatible with the view 
> that the mental is an emergent property of complex physical 
> organization (which you sometimes espouse).

I have no fixed idea at all about the relationship of the mental and the
physical. Just about every view I have seen has strengths and
weaknesses. So I doubt I have ever espoused the view you mention, but I
have wondered what Buddhism might look like to someone who does espouse
that view. That issue aside, the stance you refer to can be see in (at
least) two ways. 1) One can see the mental as essentially a shorthand
way of referring to brain states---this is the reductionist view. 2) One
can see the mental as merging from and therefore entirely dependent on
the physical---this would be the supervenience view. Both of those views
are rejected by Dharmakiirti (and no doubt many other Buddhists---I
mention DhK only because I am working on a translation of his work on
this topic, so it is on my mind, or at least on my brain states).

> Personally, I don't see a problem here. I am happy to see the body as 
> an evolving complex of processes (rather than entities); I don't need 
> to envisage some over-arching body entity. Nor do I see the need for 
> entities rather than processes in describing the mind. Of course, 
> these things _are_ convenient some times.

Well then, supervenience theory will not appeal to you. But others may
benefit by it, so it is there for them to use.

> What we do have to bear in mind is that anatta / anaatman in Buddhism 
> is a method of meditation, not a philosophical theory.

There is no reason why a meditation method should not be made into a
philosophical theory by people who like philosophical theories. And for
those who think it naive to think that any practice is theory-neutral,
looking at theory is an inescapable part of doing practice. I suppose
that may be part of the reason we have so many Indian Buddhist texts
that could accurately be described as philosophical.

> Or, to put it another way the purpose of meditation on impermanence 
> or unsatisfactoriness or no-self is to arouse disenchantment 
> (nibbidaa) with what ever has enchanted the mind. Only after that can 
> there be clear seeing.  Enchanted minds see only enchantments.

I can see your answer the the question "Are we sick of dogma yet?" is
No. 

-- 
Richard Hayes <rhayes at unm.edu>
University of New Mexico