[Buddha-l] Buddhas Meditation

[Richard Hayes]

On Jul 8, 2011, at 13:18 , Franz Metcalf wrote:

> Thank you, I promise I will. But just a quick work, first, since one  
> of Dan's points really disturbed me. I had previously written that  
> calming the suffering in the mind of the oppressor/harmer/animal  
> killer was a desideratum. A lesser one that ending the oppression/ 
> harming/killing, but still a desideratum.

This whole discussion has been taken it for granted that consequentialism is the only valid meta-ethical theory. With all due respects to Charles Goodman, who has argued at great length and very intelligently that Buddhist ethics are consequentialist in nature, I remain unconvinced. The principal thrust of most Buddhist discussions of śīla, it seems to me, is that it is desirable to cultivate virtues. Virtues need no justification, although it does turn out that being virtuous tends to increase the likelihood that one will be contented. Virtues are neither augmented nor diminished by the consequences of having them. I agree with Keown, Harvey and others in seeing that as the tone of most Buddhist discussions of śīla. And I believe it explains why there is hardly any casuistry in Asian Buddhist texts. Considering all sorts of hypothetical scenarios and thinking about what the limits of a rule are is the sort of thinking one does in deontological and consequentialist ethical systems, but it is relatively rare in virtue ethics.

Here is how it seems to me one can look from a virtue-ethics point of view at the claim that it is preferable to be compassionate without attachment than to be compassioanate with attachments to one's compassion. Being compassionate is a virtue. So is unconditional positive regard for others. If one's cultivation of compassion leads one to have a diminished regard for others, then one's overall virtue is less, because one's regard for others is conditional, which is less virtuous than unconditional positive regard.

There are various reasons to be wary of consequentialist approaches to ethics. The principal one for me is that there is no reliable way to determine the valence of consequences, and no reliable way to take a full account of what the consequences of an action are. Every action has effects that go on indefinitely and that have an impact on countless beings. It may sound sensible to ask whether it does more harm to kill an animal or to hurt the feelings of a carnivore, but that is a hopelessly flat-footed question, because it cherry picks consequences out of a much larger set of consequences. The question is framed in such a way that it seems there is only one possible rational answer. Alas, moral reasoning is hardly ever that simple. Measuring the amount of good or harm that an action does is not as simple as determining whether the retired sumo wrestler Takamiyama displaces more water than Dan Lusthaus when he enters a hot tub.

Needless to say, every ethical theory has its weaknesses. Not everyone is drawn to virtue ethics and find its weaknesses unacceptable. If one is an ethical pluralist, that is not bothersome. It just means different people make different kinds of decisions about what particular conduct is tolerable, acceptable or commendable. Why should there be only one answer to the question of what is tolerable or commendable? I look at most issues from a virtue-ethics perspective. Dan looks at most issues from a consequentialist perspective. It is not surprising that we end up with different decisions from time to time on what is acceptable. And to me it is not even disconcerting.

Richard