[Buddha-l] karma and consequences

[Robert Ellis]

I wonder why there is such a rush to defend the traditional doctrine of karma, or to quibble with my definition, rather than engage with the central point. Curt's clarification does add precision about "intentional action", but no-one has engaged with the central epistemological point about requital. I understand that many Buddhists do understand karma in mental terms, and not strictly as a doctrine about the phenomenal universe, but it is just as dogmatic if it applies only to the effects of our?mental processes,?in which causal?mental processes produce?proportionate effectual?mental processes. The point remains that the law of karma, in any version I have ever come across in traditional Buddhism (whether in suttas or in the mouths of Buddhists) claims an equivalence of result for all actions, and that?this claim lies completely beyond our experience. Nobody has said this isn't the case, but only?offered?distractions from this basic point.

Of course I am offering my opinion, and I am not referring to specific accounts in specific suttas, but generalising about the Buddhist account of karma as I have encountered it. If I give a source from a particular sutta this will probably create a scholarly discussion, but my point is philosophical (and by implication practical). 

Vicente, I think there is a major difference between the law of karma and atomic theory which stops me accepting your analogy. Atomic theory makes fruitful predictions which we can then apply in experience, but karmic theory makes no such predictions. All it tells us is that we will experience the effects of our actions sometime. Karma is thus metaphysical in a way that atoms are not, because there are no conceivable circumstances where, individually or scientifically, we could make use of what it teaches.

Jayarava, I did not respond to your example because to do so would involve inappropriate discussion of the character of an individual on this public forum, but needless to say I do not?accept it as a counter-example?(and by the way, I wish you would stop turning this discussion into an inappropriate trial of my character as well, and stick to the issues).

Jayarava wrote <<Faith communities tend to be happier at least in the ways in which happiness can be measured. The happiest people in the US are the Amish - one of the most dogmatic faith communities in the world.<<
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This is an interesting example, and one I am happier to discuss here than the individual you mentioned earlier. I have not been advancing the thesis that dogmatic faith leads to unhappiness, only that it prevents us from addressing conditions (which may of course include those of happiness, but also many others). The Amish's dogmatic faith stops them addressing many of the conditions in the world around them, which I would imagine (without having studied the Amish in detail) creates many conflicts and difficulties. Nevertheless, their strong community and the focus on spiritual experience in their lives probably also allows them to address many psychological conditions that other people in the modern US fail to address. My guess is that the extent to which they hold dogmatic faith causes them problems, but that on balance they may also be less dogmatic in their daily lives than many of the rest of us.

There is also a deeper pont here. It is not faith itself that I see as the problem (and this is where I disagree with "new atheists" like Sam Harris), but the appeal to it to justify positions. Faith by itself can be quite an open,?provisional (but none the less deep) commitment. It is the failure to respect uncertainty that leads to dogmatism, and the Amish's position could be seen positively as an acceptance of?uncertainty about modern society.

Best wishes,
Robert


Robert Ellis

website: www.moralobjectivity.net