[Buddha-l] Sabba Sutta

[jkirk]

Thanks Bruce and Bill~~~~~~it's a lot clearer now. 
Bill wrote: "...is largely in accord with prevailing analyses in
cognitive science, such as found in Antonio Damasio's work, for
example."
Is there one term from cognitive science for these processes
comparable to the one-term 'alaya vijnana'? 
Or does cognitive science propose a collection of terms for the
same processes? 

Joanna 

-----Original Message-----
From: buddha-l-bounces at mailman.swcp.com
[mailto:buddha-l-bounces at mailman.swcp.com] On Behalf Of Bruce
Burrill
Sent: Wednesday, November 26, 2008 3:38 AM


Here is Bill Waldron's direct response (via me, since I asked to
respond to jkirk's msg) to the  Alaya-vijnana question:

The mode of nonconscious mental processes called Alaya-vijnana
influence perception in a variety of indispensable ways, all of
which are expressed in the traditional literature using
traditional technical jargon. This means that other ways of
expressing this are all interpretations, useful but not quite the
same.

Alaya-vijnana is thought to underlie and support ordinary,
conscious experience insofar as this level of nonconscious mental
processes provide an elaborate basis for any cognition, any
perception, to occur at all. Alaya-vijnana is a name we give to
these supporting processes.

Think of everything that must be happening in your brain/mind in
order for you to perceive, say, a flower, or to understand
language. We are conscious of only the slightest part of these
processes. The rest are outside of our awareness, but they must
be occurring -this is a safe and attested inference- in order for
us to re-cognize anything.

To be more specific, when we cognize a flower, we recognize that
it is a "flower" because we have had previous experience with
flowers, which laid "impressions" in the brain/mind, that are
triggered when we see "flowers" again. Included in these
impressions are names and concepts that help us cognize and
re-cognize 'flowers.' When we hear a language we know, we
typically focus on the meaning rather than, say, the phonemes,
the morphemes or the syntax (sounds, words, grammar). 
As with perception, all of this-for the most part-operates
automatically, unconsciously,, and without special effort.

By contrast, a new-born baby does not have the  capacity to
distinguish shapes, to cognize objects or to understand words.
The neural networks created through visual experience take time;
our visual faculties are trained, as it were, to see certain
visual configurations and eventually cognize them as specific
"objects." 
Language-naming and concepts-refers to to and reinforces such
re-cognitions.

The capacity to perceive "flowers" is thus a learned capacity,
and "flowers" are a complex product of physical and mental
processes, processes whose enabling capacities have been built up
over time and which operate automatically and simultaneously in
every perception. These underlying processes are a bit like the
roots of a plant, which are in constant and supporting
interaction with the leaves above ground. Perceived objects, in
this sense, are complex products, rather than simple causes, of
perceptual processes.

The underlying (or subliminal "below the
threshold") cognitive processes that support and underlie
perception in this fashion are what are referred as
Alaya-vijnana. This analysis of perception is based upon the
Samdhinirmocanca Sutra and the Yogacarabhumi, and is largely in
accord with prevailing analyses in cognitive science, such as
found in Antonio Damasio's work, for example.

If you want even simpler English (but less direct
exposition) read Thich Nhat Hanh's Understanding the Mind.

Bill Waldron


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