[Buddha-l] Sabba Sutta

[jkirk]

Sri panditas,

May I ask what might be an irrelevant question--but it's based on
my perplexity for some time over the concept of the alaya
vijnana. Does the alaya vij. function in any way as a contributor
to anything we might construe as perception, discrimination,
judgment, as a precursor to knowledge? 
If not, what is it's functions? (Please don't refer me to the
literature on this function, which I find to be as impenetrable
as reading pomo critiques. You should be able to put your reply
into plain Engrish.)

Thanks, Joanna K.
===========================================

Richard, I'm exploring the use to which the Sabba Sutta has been
put and our friend Kalupahana has made much of it. I've found
your "Gotama Buddha and Religious Pluralism", J. of Religious
Pluralism 1:65-96 (1991), in which you critique the view that he
justifies using the Sabba Sutta.

In his 1976 book - Buddhist Philosophy - Kalupahana includes an
appendix on epistemology in which he makes the case that the
Buddha's empiricism was similar to the Positivist rejection of
metaphysics. You argue that other views expressed by the Buddha -
largely value judgements - run counter to the spirit of
Positivism. The context is a discussion of the Buddha's silence,
and it seems that your pointing out the Buddha's own answer is a
killer argument. However I have a question.

You write "Wisdom consists in the ability to discriminate those
actions of the body, speech and thought that are competent from
those that are not. But such discrimination is a matter of
judgement, and judgement necessarily goes beyond any knowledge
that can be acquired immediately through the senses". p.8 (you
miss this bit out in your Appreciation of Nagarjuna which largely
repeats the argument p.358 f.).

I read Kalupahana as including the mind sense in his empiricism.
Surely discrimination is a function of, and wisdom is acquired
through, the mind sense? Doesn't this contradict what you are
saying?

Kalupahana has of course rewritten that book - A History of
Buddhist Philosophy, 1992 -  and has dropped that appendix and
the reference to Positivism. However he retains the view that the
physical senses and the mind are the only possible sources of
knowledge (here of course he cites the Sabba Sutta). He insists
that Insight/Wisdom cannot be completely divorced from the senses
(he again includes the mind I think). (p.112)

Have you an opinion on Kalupahana's newer version of the Buddha's
empiricism?  

Do we, from an early Buddhist point of view, have sources of
knowledge other than the physical senses and the mind? 

Best wishes
Jayarava


      

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