[Buddha-l] Pramana terms

[Piya Tan]

Thanks Richard & Dan,

The reference comes from the Oxford Dictionary of Buddhism (ed Damien
Keown et al):

Oxford Dictionary of
Buddhism<http://books.google.com.sg/books?hl=en&id=KE56vyhOHGsC&dq=%22Dictionary+of+Buddhism%22+Oxford&printsec=frontcover&source=web&ots=k1J9Pvi93H&sig=c4c8XA0PO3yVZ7o526joiHYoU48&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=9&ct=result#PPA219,M1>

Richard's answer helps to explains the sense of the two terms to me. Thanks.
Dan's exposition is really help for my follow-up reading. Thanks, again.

Piya Tan




On Sun, Nov 16, 2008 at 2:10 PM, Dan Lusthaus <vasubandhu at earthlink.net>wrote:

> If I can piggyback on Richard's thoughtful answer, there is at least one
> important additional distinction between svaartha inference and paraartha
> inference for Dignaga, a distinction that, I believe, is no longer
> operative
> (at least in the same way) with Dharmakirti and his subsequents.
>
> This additional distinction is often overlooked in the secondary literature
> because it is primarily laid out in Dignaga's Nyaayamukha, which only
> survives in Chinese (two translations), and people who work on pramanavada
> tend to deal with Tibetan and Sanskrit, not Chinese. (I haven't seen the
> relevant portions of the Jinendrabuddhi text that would deal with this yet,
> so don't know if/how they modify what Nyayamukha says.)
>
> For Dignaga a pramana provides knowledge, but in certain specific senses.
> First, a specific pramana provides knowledge that cannot be provided by any
> other means or pramana. Thus, the knowledge gained by perception cannot be
> gained from inference and vice versa. There is no inferential argument that
> can settle whether the moon is round -- that knowledge can only be gained
> by
> perception; to attempt an inference addressing that would be automatically
> fallacious.
>
> Second, a pramana only provides new knowledge, something not known before.
> Hence what "knowledge" means in this context is not a storehouse or set of
> accumulated facts, but something realized in the moment. Hence when two
> people are arguing with inferences, one is trying to convince the other of
> something the first person already (thinks he) knows. For him, the argument
> is not a pramana, just an inference. If he is successful in awakening
> knowledge in the second person, then the inference served as a pramana for
> the second person, but not for the one proferring the argument. That is
> paraartha anumaa.na.
>
> When one is reasoning inferentially to figure out something one doesn't
> know
> yet, and is successful in acquiring that knowledge, that is svaartha
> anumaa.na.
>
> Knowledge once acquired no longer involves pramana. The turning point,
> perhaps, is the moment one reaches a ni"scaya -- a decisive judgement
> concerning some matter.
>
> Perception, since always novel from moment to moment, is a perpetual
> pramana -- but only if one takes cognizance of it (svasa.mvitti).
>
> If Richard (or anyone else) understands Dignaga differently, I'd be
> interested to hear an explanation.
>
> Dan
>
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