[Buddha-l] Pramana terms

[Dan Lusthaus]

If I can piggyback on Richard's thoughtful answer, there is at least one
important additional distinction between svaartha inference and paraartha
inference for Dignaga, a distinction that, I believe, is no longer operative
(at least in the same way) with Dharmakirti and his subsequents.

This additional distinction is often overlooked in the secondary literature
because it is primarily laid out in Dignaga's Nyaayamukha, which only
survives in Chinese (two translations), and people who work on pramanavada
tend to deal with Tibetan and Sanskrit, not Chinese. (I haven't seen the
relevant portions of the Jinendrabuddhi text that would deal with this yet,
so don't know if/how they modify what Nyayamukha says.)

For Dignaga a pramana provides knowledge, but in certain specific senses.
First, a specific pramana provides knowledge that cannot be provided by any
other means or pramana. Thus, the knowledge gained by perception cannot be
gained from inference and vice versa. There is no inferential argument that
can settle whether the moon is round -- that knowledge can only be gained by
perception; to attempt an inference addressing that would be automatically
fallacious.

Second, a pramana only provides new knowledge, something not known before.
Hence what "knowledge" means in this context is not a storehouse or set of
accumulated facts, but something realized in the moment. Hence when two
people are arguing with inferences, one is trying to convince the other of
something the first person already (thinks he) knows. For him, the argument
is not a pramana, just an inference. If he is successful in awakening
knowledge in the second person, then the inference served as a pramana for
the second person, but not for the one proferring the argument. That is
paraartha anumaa.na.

When one is reasoning inferentially to figure out something one doesn't know
yet, and is successful in acquiring that knowledge, that is svaartha
anumaa.na.

Knowledge once acquired no longer involves pramana. The turning point,
perhaps, is the moment one reaches a ni"scaya -- a decisive judgement
concerning some matter.

Perception, since always novel from moment to moment, is a perpetual
pramana -- but only if one takes cognizance of it (svasa.mvitti).

If Richard (or anyone else) understands Dignaga differently, I'd be
interested to hear an explanation.

Dan