[Buddha-l] Realism, anti-realism and Buddhism

[Dan Lusthaus]

This bounced (too big), so splitting it into two posts:

Here's the test case. It comes from Sthiramati's Trimsika-bhasya. The
translation is rough (corrections, emendations welcome). It is one of the
strongest anti-literalist statements I know of in Buddhist literature. It
comes at the tail end of Sthiramati's comments on Trimsika 1 which mentions
that aatman and dharmas are upacara (figurative). Atman, he tells us, is how
ordinary people talk about things, while dharmas (skandhas, ayatanas,
dhatus, etc.) are how "saastras talk about the same thing -- i.e., ordinary
vs technical language. loka-śāstrayor (And thus "atman and dharmas" does not
mean, for him, "self and other").

He eventually entertains, at some length, some literalist theories of
metaphor (upacaara), rejecting them, and concludes as follows:

---
Therefore, [contrary to the opponent’s claims,] even [the notion that] a
real thing (dravya) [lies behind] a figurative expression (upacāra) is
unreasonable.

Even a [metaphysically real] verbal-referent (padārtha) of a literal-word
(mukhya) does not exist (nāsti) because [by your own admission] the
essential-form of that (tatsvarūpa) [verbal-referent (padārtha)] has the
property of exceeding (atikrānta) the cognitive-linguistic sphere (viṣaya)
of all cognitions (jñāna) and designations (abhidhāna); [Similarly,
concerning the assumption that] a pradhāna, [i.e., that a metaphysically
real substantial entity lies behind, and acts both as as the cause of and
the object of reference for cognitions and designations, actually]
cognitions and designations occur only because of qualities (guṇarūpa),
since there is no cognitive contact (asaṃsparśa) with the essential-form
(svarūpa) of that [pradhāna]. Otherwise [the notion of] 'quality' would
(suffer) the fallacy of uselessness (vaiyarthya-prasaṅga) [since a.'quality'
mediates between a cognition and a thing in-itself; if we directly cognize
things in-themselves, the need for a mediator becomes moot.]

And since there is no other means by which to accurately define
(paricchitti) the essential-form of a verbal-referent (padārtha-svarūpa),
aside from cognition and designations, it should be understood that, in the
absence of cognitive and designatory acts, there is no sphere (in which) the
svarūpa of a pradhāna, nor the padārtha of a mukhya [could exist];
because, to the extent there is no causal-relation (saṃbandha) [between a
mukhya and padārtha] and no cognition or designation [of a pradhāna], to
that extent there is no [reasonable sense in which one may speak of a]
'designator' (abhidhāna) [referring to a] 'designated' (abhidheya);
therefore, neither is there [anything real designated by the terms] mukhya
and padārtha. All of these are only gauṇa [metaphors, figurative,
adjectival], and not literal (mukhya).

A name (nāma) is gauṇa (metaphoric) when it is that which occurs from rūpas
(forms) for which nothing actual [lying behind them] is found.

All articulations (śabda) occur by means of 'qualities' (guṇarūpa) for which
no actual pradhāna is found. Therefore, there is simply no such thing as a
mukhya (literal-word).
So, what was said above [by the pūrvapakṣin], viz. "that it is not logical
for the figurative expression (upacāra) 'dharma' to [refer] to what is not
actual (asat)," is [itself] illogical.

(Continued in next post)
Dan