[Buddha-l] Realism, anti-realism and Buddhism

[Dan Lusthaus]

Richard,

And, with the exception of Schmithausen, none of them
> > are much better read in Yogacara literature than you.
>
> I think that's false. I have read no Yogacara literature at all (unless
> you insist that Vi.m'satika, Trim.'sika, Aalamba.napariik.sa,
> Pramaa.nasamuccaya and Pramaa.navaarttika are Yogacara works---I have no
> convictions on that matter). I don't think it can be said of the other
> scholars you mention that they have read as little as I have.

In conversations and in their writings, I see no evidence that their reading
list is much larger than yours (perhaps a few have read some
madhyanta-vibhaga, but that's it).

As for contextualizing one's reading with other works, I wasn't proposing
that one has to read all the Great Works of Humanity in order to figure out
one small e e cummings poem, but I do find that all texts are intertextual,
and that Indian philosophical texts in particular are invariably engaged in
debates with opponents, often writing in a context that was filled with well
known stock arguments, many of which are not spelled out explicitly or in
sufficient detail to alert the uninitiated in the particular texts
themselves.

Further, one post-Dignaga development (noticed possibly for the first time
in the works of Bhavaviveka) is that texts begin to cite -- verbatim and in
some detail -- the arguments of their opponents before refuting them. Prior
to Bhavaviveka, only enough of an opponent's argument to *suggest* his
position, or to give one enough material to play with, is provided (e.g.,
the Nyaya-like snippets at beginning of Vigraha-vyavartani). The sort of
copious quotation of opponents that one finds, for instance, in Kumarila's
"Slokavartika or Santaraksita's Tattvasamgraha, is not present earlier.

So to read Vasubandhu, one should read his *predecessors* (subsequent
commentaries can be helpful, but I hold less stock in their ability to offer
undistorted viewpoints) as well as his other works. That not only provides
important contextual information, but also helps identify whatever is novel
or original in Vasubandhu, etc. Vimsatika is a stand-alone work only to the
extent one understands his usage of terms, and the issues he's raising.

Instead of this sort of contextual work, modern readers substitute the
assumption that he is an idealist, and then try to make the text and its
arguments personify that, even when it becomes obvious that as arguments for
idealism what Vasubandhu says is "counterproductive." Hence, the conclusion
usually is that he is a bad philosopher with poor arguments, since he
undermines his own supposed idealism. Without forcing that assumption on
him, however, he becomes a very shrewd and original philosopher, with
compelling, ingenious arguments.

>in a century or so, people will know
> enough that they will laugh at both of you, though for different
> reasons.

Why wait so long? I can always use a good laugh.

> I think you dramatically overstate Schmithausen's lack of philosophical
> acumen.

Lamotte somewhere (I think in his Vimalakirti translation) states that he
has done the philological work, so now some philosophers will be able to
take it from there. He had the right sense of proportion. I base my
estimation of Schmithausen's philosophical acumen on precisely what he says,
claims, and criticizes, not on who he does or doesn't talk to. He is a sweet
generous soul, but he holds some very questionable ideas about Yogacara. If
you are coming to the IABS, and are willing to buy me a triple latte or a
beer, I'll rattle some of them off for you.

>As I use the
> term "phenomenalist," I mean someone who thinks we can know only with
> sense data, ideas and images within our own cognition but can never be
> certain what the relationship is between those images and the world as
> it is outside human awareness. So a phenomenalist, I take it, takes a
> middle position between a realist and an idealist in that he regards the
> question of the existence of the external world as unknowable.

I take the classical Yogacara position (Asanga, Vasubandhu, Sthiramati) to
be that prior to asraya-paravrtti we are all phenomenalists, in the sense
you mention, whether we know it or not (and this is roughly equivalent to
what is also called an epistemological idealist), but after asraya-paravrtti
we are fully engaged in the world as it is, with all doubts and
uncertainties eliminated. For Dignaga (e.g., at the end of
Alambana-pariksa), he allows things to remain aporetic. Whether that is his
final thought on the matter, or merely a concession to the constraints of
the prajnaptic limitations of anumana is hard to say (I suspect the latter,
but cannot offer an anumana to prove that). Dharmakirti seems to follow the
same aporetic strategy.

>. I don't find "noumenon" a very useful concept for
> talking about Indian philosophy. It has a very particular meaning in
> modern Western philosophy, but I see no counterparts for the notion of
> noumena in either medieval European or pre-medieval Indian thought.

While not an exact fit, some of what Yogacara texts say about the contrast
between bimba and pratibimba is similar to the noumenal/phenomenal
distinction. In early Husserlian vocabulary this would correspond with the
distinction between hyletic data and noema. The way Asanga sometimes (not
always) uses vastu would also suggest something closer to noumenal than
phenomenal (vi.saya, aalambana, pratibhaasa, aabhaasa, etc.).

Dan Lusthaus