[Buddha-l] Five moral objections to karma

[Richard Nance]

W.F. Wong, quoting W.R.P. Kaufman, posed the following problem:

>   5. The free will problem
>      "can karma be squared at all with the existence of free moral
>      agents?"

I don't see why not.  I haven't read Kaufman's piece, but I assume
that he's worried about a world in which our actions are determined in
advance -- where "determined" is taken to involve our absence of
agency with respect to our actions and intentions to act. Kaufman may
be worried that accepting a notion of karma (of course, there are
multiple notions of karma, but let's bracket this concern for the
moment) means that one has thereby embraced such a picture of the
world: karma effectively makes human into puppets controlled by the
past.

But why would it? Why can't we simply assume that intentions (and
intentional actions) have consequences, and that those consequences
can include propensities to act -- and propensities to view the world
-- in particular ways in the future?  Must we choose between denying
the existence of such inclinations and living at their mercy?  I don't
think so.  If we accept the idea that we are beings whose views and
actions are both influenced and influential, we haven't thereby denied
freedom; at least, we haven't denied any freedom that is recognizably
human.  A notion of freedom that can incorporate such complexities
seems to me much more useful -- and philosophically interesting --
than a notion of freedom that finds them threatening.

Best wishes,

R. Nance