[Buddha-l] Bangladesh Muslim lovefest

[Dan Lusthaus]

 Erik writes:
>so here applies the argument of Na-ga-rjuna in MMK 9:

>8
>Who in a discussion answers with an appeal to emptiness when an
objection is made, makes all his (points) that are not disproved invalid
with the proof.

>9
>Who in a comment answers with an appeal to emptiness when criticism is
made, makes all his (points) that are not criticized invalid with the
proof.

Pleading for immunity? No one mentioned emptiness, and the verses you cited 
do not address questions of distinguishing samvrti, prajnapti, etc. So 
pretty much irrelevant.


>Science has made it abundantly clear that if you want to save the forest, 
>you have to save the trees. Bringing offerings to the spirit of the forest 
>didn't help very much.

"trees" are no less prajnaptic than "forest," so your point is moot.

>
> That "groups" are prajnaptis and hence in an important sense "unreal" does 
> not mean that they don't exist at all: samvrti-sat. To mistake samvrti-sat 
> for dismissible nonexistence is cheap sophistry, and dangerous for a 
> Buddhist; it is precisely the sort of incorrigible trap that Nagarjuna 
> warns is like grasping a snake the wrong way.
It does, because no one ever had a decent conversation with the team
spirit of the Red Sox or the group identitiy of all New York citizens
with a black tie.

Apparently you can't tell the difference between parikalpita and paratantra.

And if you think people don't hold deep and meaningful conversations with 
the spirit of the Red Sox -- and do more than talk -- you haven't spent time 
in Boston where the Sox are a religion.


>This is a classical sophistry, called a fork. From the fact that choices
are not 100% based on reflection, but also on coïncidence and
conditions, does not follow that they are completely caused.

No forks, knives or spoons involved. Since you cited Nagarjuna, let me 
remind you that for Nagarjuna as well as the Yogacaras to say that anything 
is "uncaused" is untenable. You are confusing the fact that conditions 
behind a decision (a more buddhistic term than "choice") are not monocausal, 
with the idea that there is something unconditioned in the decision. 
Nothing, including decisions are monocausal; they arise through the 
confluence of many conditions. There is not God whose mind must know 
beforehand how all the billiard balls on every pool table in the universe 
while move before the cue ball is even hit. Conditions vary, but with 
propensities, habits, repetitions, etc., so some degree of predictability 
(not predestination). It is the complexity and variance of assisting 
conditions (will the seed get enough water, sun, soil nutrients, eaten by 
moles?). Your choices are conditioned -- hence you like what you like, 
disagree with what you disagree with. Precisly because, as you yourself put 
it: you weren't born yesterday. Hence no sophistic either/or fork. 
Nonetheless, conditioned.

>freewill is not Christian nor Medieval, that is predestination.

The concept of freewill indeed is Christian and medieval. Predestination is 
its antithesis. So the dilemma that engaged Luther and Erasmus was which was 
more true, and what has entertained some theologians and philosophers is how 
to reconcile them -- Calvin doubled-down. (Ironically, the stronger a case 
that is made for predestination, the more urgency and sophistication is 
required to make counter-case for freewill -- in the absence of one, the 
other becomes superfluous). In Islamic philosophy choosing for yourself is 
satanic (that's what made Satan what he is -- one is to 
obey/submit/surrender/islam to God's will unquestioningly and in every way; 
thinking for yourself is delusional and dangerous). Some Jewish thinkers 
tinkered with notions of freewill, but basically under Christian influence; 
it is not a key element of Jewish thinking (biblical emphasis is on 
obedience, not choosing, medieval Jewish phil. is about integrating science 
and tradition, not about 'choosing'). Christians who early on distinguished 
themselves from their mediterranean peers by emphasizing 'faith' (personal 
belief) over action and knowledge are the ones who made choosing (ie., 
freewill) the centerpiece, esp. after Tertullian (Credo quia absurdum; I 
believe BECAUSE it is absurd). Protestantism doubled-down on that in the 
Renaissance when it was clear that science and faith painted utterly 
incommensurate pictures of the universe; hence one was supposed to *choose*; 
medieval-minded Christians in the US Bible Belt still think their religion 
consists in making that choice.)

As for India or China -- there is no Sanskrit or Chinese term corresponding 
to freewill. Choices are made on the basis of conditioning; when karma comes 
to fruition it is vipaka which is always karmically neutrally (it has spent 
it's charge), and at that point there is leeway to not restart or resume the 
habit (karma). Most of the time we do anyway. That's as close to free choice 
as is offered by Buddhism. That's also why Buddhism prescribes active 
countermeasures and antidotes (called in the West "practice") to alter those 
habits and change the odds on their repetition. One is trained to condition 
oneself. Which is why the Chinese term for practice means to do something 
repeatedly, or to cultivate (planting, weeding, tending, and harvesting each 
involve multiple repetitive tasks).

>The funny part is that you seem to forget that responsibility is also 
>prajnaptic and samvrti and that it is even a way people relate to each 
>other.

Not forgotten. That is what I said from the beginning.

>No one is just responsible, you need someone to whom you are responsible 
>and someone who holds you responsible.

In Buddhism nothing is independent. Mutual dependencies entail mutual 
responsibilities. Hence everything is responsible, and the more aware you 
are (in Mahayana jargon, the higher up the bodhisattva ladder), the MORE 
responsible you are toward sentient beings. This dependency is nicely 
captured in Georgios Halkias' translation of a passage from the Vimalakirti 
Sutra (in his brand new _Luminous Bliss: A Religious History of Pure Land 
Literature in Tibet_, Univ of Hawaii Press, 2013, p. 10):

--
To the extent that Bodhisattvas favour beings do they acquire buddhaksetras. 
To the extent that beings produce all sorts of pure qualities do 
Bodhisattvas acquire buddhaksetras. To the extent that beings are 
disciplined by these pure buddhaksetras do Bodhisattvas acquire 
buddhaksetras... (VS 1, sec. 12)
--

Dan