[Buddha-l] Non attached & mindful culinary triumphalism?

andy stroble at hawaii.edu
Thu Jul 14 16:59:09 MDT 2011


Dan wrote: 
> I see Andy took his vitamins today. Ok, let's dig in.
<selective snips> 
> > It is in the nature of human culture . Ergo it is at least
>  as "natural" to insist on and impose such rules as it is to have urges to
>  stray.
> 
"At least as natural" means that there is no basis for the preference.  
Richard's point (which I believe he has reinforced on his own), is that 
"natural" or "nature" is a code for idiosyncratic preference.  And if that is 
all there is, we ought to at least be honest about it, like the English 
Emotivists.  

>>   But that doesn't answer  the
> > question.  What is wrong with it?
> 
> The desire to want to pin things down univocally is admirable, but not
> always practical and sometimes not feasible. As with the famous definition
> (was it O.W. Holmes?) of pornography: "I know it when I see it," some
>  things are a bit elusive, retain some ambiguity and wiggling room, and yet
>  are sufficiently clear under most circumstances to allow one to act
> appropriately in relation to them.
> 

Potter Stewart, USSC.  But the point is not that things are just obscure.  
When we know it, there is either something we know, or there is not. If we 
cannot articulate what it is we claim to know, there is a fair chance we are 
only expressing a irrational preference.  

> Why
> homogenize the differences just to satisfy an urge for a univocal
>  universal?

No urge.  Certainly there are many things that come under a particular 
guideline, but like Justice Stewart, there is something that makes impropriety 
impropietious, if we can see it.   And even the fact that lots of humans, lots 
of cultures, and lots of history all see the impropriety, does not make it any 
more clear _what_ this thing is that we see.  The universal is hidden in this 
assumed consensus, all I am asking for is explication. 
 
<Eliding most of the entire history of Chinese philosophy>
> >In either case, following
> > the Dao is allegedly better than not.  The question is why?
> 
> Because it works, and it is the dao, lit. the "way" things work. Why is it
> better to put the horse before the cart? Because that is the dao of horse
> carts. The Chinese are more direct and focused on the practical, pragmatic,
> and utilitarian (in various mixes). The side-step to a universal justifier
> is not a dance they found interesting or inviting.
> 

Have you ever done woodwork?  The Dao of woodsaws (single, not double-handed) 
is to cut on the push stroke and clear on the pull.   Just the way things are. 
. . in the West.  Japanese woodsaws cut on the pull stroke, which makes the 
blade straight, and allows for finer cuts, thinner sawblades, and so on.  My 
point?  Working is relative.  And Japanese saws are better for cutting. 


> > Homo Ridens?  Are you sure it is "healthy" humans who have this capacity?
> 
> The fact that you would ask that makes me laugh.
> 
Good, that means you must be healthy!  




> The point of Mencius' turn to the issue of basic human nature was precisely
> to give the virtues touted by Confucians an ontological basis, which is why
> the question of human-nature is the Chinese counterpart to the West's
> concern with ontology and the existence of God, occupying a similar
> ubiquitous, central position. And why Buddhism wasn't speaking (to) Chinese
> until it developed the idea of buddha-nature as the Buddhist entry in that
> unavoidable debate.

Hmm,   so there is a injection of Chinese morality in Chinese Buddhism? 
Why would this debate be unavoidable?  

> 
> The distinction drawn by Buddhists -- and apparently British law -- between
> laws according to the nature of the act or according to conventional
> consensus suggests that for some ontology and morality are not separate
> domains, though morality includes an "artificial" as well as a "natural"
> domain.
> 
The distinction goes back to Roman law, were non-citizens were held to be 
liable under the ius gentium.   I  find Hugo Grotius to be useful, as a window 
into natural law thinking. 

> >But they do tend to be universal  claims.
> 
> That is the precise point when ethics degenerates into moralism, and when
> the problems begin.

Hmm, what is the difference, and what are the problems?   These questions are 
only partially facietious. 

> 
> >When Buddhists say that killing is wrong, the implication is that it
> > is always wrong, and wrong for anyone to do.
> 
> Even Buddhists qualify this. The Skt passage from the Bodhisattvabhumi that
> I recently posted stipulates under which conditions one SHOULD kill a
> tyrant. The rules against killing are much stricter when applied to clerics
> than to laypeople, and even less to rulers or soldiers. So your assumption
> that an elusive "universal" -- applied equally to all once and for all --
>  is entailed by Buddhists stating that killing is wrong is itself wrong.
> 
> > Again, the question is "why?"
> 
> Actually, it tends to be "which?"

Dan!  You ARE arguing in circles!  Just a short while ago, when the Northern 
Coast of California was being oppressed by giant trees that just stood there, 
you were insisting that the intention or mental state of those who cut them 
down did not matter!    'Which' is a function of "why'.   You many not agree 
with my analysis of which redwoods to take out, but that would only be because 
you do not have access to the intelligence that I do.   I know a tyrant tree 
when I see one. 

> 
> > Now if our justification for such a prohibition is that it can have bad
> > consequences, we have made it into a principle of prudence rather than
> > morality,
> 
> You are working toward a very narrow sense of morality. Careful you don't
> end up straitjacketing yourself.

Normative force, that's what I am interested in.  What is it that requires an 
action be done?   And more so, what is it that allows anyone to insist on the 
rightness or wrongness of any actions, especially to the point that they might 
think they are justified in using force to incapacitate or compel.  Now I don't 
think that is a narrow sense of morality, just what it is, when I see it.   

-- 
James Andy Stroble, PhD
Lecturer in Philosophy
Department of Arts & Humanities
Leeward Community College
University of Hawaii


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