[Buddha-l] Non attached & mindful culinary triumphalism?

[andy]

> A polemical soliloquy that seems rhetorically compelling, but a counter
>  case could be made with the same sort arguments.
> 
> The argument *for* acknowledging malum in se (bad in itself) would run
> something like: while some people certainly mess around (adultery, incest),
> all societies ban illicit sexual relations. They may fine tune their
> definition of incest (are first cousins on or off limits? Second cousins?),
> or be more or less tolerant of types of adultery, but all insist that "Thou
> shalt not (unless...)..." It is in the nature of human culture to forbid
> such relations (though their enforcement and degree and style of
>  disapproval may vary, just as their taste in foods may vary -- nonetheless
>  all eat).

Not a counter-case at all.  Philosophically speaking (which I tend to do), the 
question is what is wrong with sexual impropiety itself?  We may suspect that 
the fact that all human societies have some prohibitions on it means that 
there must be something "wrong" about it.  But that doesn't answer  the 
question.  What is wrong with it?  

> Richard commits the same fallacy that undergrads make when first presented
> with Mencius' theory usually expressed (in English) as "Human Nature is
> originally good." (Mencius is one of the early, great virtue ethicists.)
> That fallacy is to misconstrue what is meant by nature. Mencius never
> suggests that he means "nature" means "happens automatically." He never
> contends that we all *automatically* do good. Rather his claim is that we
> have the capacity for goodness, which, if it is nurtured, cultivated and
> allowed to grow unhindered, will develop into a full fledged "virtue" (de).

Category mistake: we are not talking about the polymorphous nature of humans, 
but about the nature of the  good.  What is held to be good by humans varies 
quite a bit, and even if it did not, it would still not be an argument for an 
objective good.  Xunzi holds human nature is originally perverse, but still  
advocates the same Confucian virtues as Mencius.  In either case, following 
the Dao is allegedly better than not.  The question is why?  

<snip>
> 
> And, no, Andy, it's not immediately translatable into "universals". All
> healthy humans have the capacity to laugh, but we don't laugh at the same
> thing (and some of us are funnier than others). Some cultures treasure
> humor, others suppress it (cf. The Name of the Rose). Laughter is neither a
> universal, nor a mere subjective particular happenstance, and there are
>  many types of laughs.

Homo Ridens?  Are you sure it is "healthy" humans who have this capacity?  
This presupposes ethical valuation, in advance.

>  Language, since it only functions with
>  samanya-laksana (generalized universalistic classes), keeps giving the
>  illusion that the variety of things that can be gathered under a word are
>  items in a "class." It's a linguistic trick, worth resisting from allowing
>  it to settle in as a mental trick. "Available to everyone" is not the same
>  as "ontological universal." But a capacity that all possess does indicate
>  something in se.
> 
> Dan

Moral claims are not ontological claims. But they do tend to be universal 
claims.  When Buddhists say that killing is wrong, the implication is that it 
is always wrong, and wrong for anyone to do.  Again, the question is "why?" 
Now if our justification for such a prohibition is that it can have bad 
consequences, we have made it into a principle of prudence rather than 
morality, and we have to inquire into what makes a consequence bad.  If we say 
it goes against human nature (though that seems questionable!), we have made a 
presumption that human nature is good. And if we just say that it is a malum 
in se, well that doesn't even address the question of why it is wrong.  

Buddhism says that killing is wrong because it causes suffering. That's all.  
But then so do harsh speech, intoxication, and sexual impropiety.  And if any 
of these actions did not have this consequence, they would not be wrong.  
Which leads us to upaya, and exemptions to the "universal" rule against 
killing. This is what I find problematic, in regard to "buddhist warfare." 

The delightful thing about budda-l is the range of disciplines.  That is also 
the frustrating thing.  Philosophers are after different questions than 
scholars of religions or anthropologists, and to a certain degree are more 
interested in logical consistency than what the diverse historical Buddhist 
tradition has said.  And we tend to question any and all presuppositions about 
the way the world is, or what is right or wrong.  The attraction of Buddhism 
is the metaphysics, and how that produces a Buddhist ethics. 


-- 
 Andy