[Buddha-l] Buddha's Meditation

Richard Hayes rhayes at unm.edu
Fri Jul 8 11:14:10 MDT 2011


On Jul 8, 2011, at 07:47 , Dan Lusthaus wrote:

> I will briefly comment on (1) why 
> the testimonial does not meet the test for empirical evidence, and -- since 
> this has been a topic on buddha-l before -- (2) why one should be cautious 
> about the phrase "speak truth to power."
> 
> It is not empirical evidence because it is indeed a testimonial by an 
> advocate.

I am not sure I see the logic behind this claim. Are you saying that someone who is part of a group cannot make an empirical claim about that group? Or are you saying that no one who is a member of a group can make an unbiased observation about that group's behavior? Or are you making some other claim, and if so, what exactly is the principle you are stating?

As I see it, the truth value of the observation that there are universalist Quakers who follow principles that qualify as moral (and that therefore it is not the case that universalism is necessarily immoral) does not depend on the convictions of the person making the observation.  

> Which is why empirical evidence requires 'outside 
> observers,' reproduction of the results of experiments by other researchers, 
> etc.

If you would like, I can supply the testimonials of quite a few non-Quakers who deem as moral the specific activities of Quakers that I mentioned.

> Al Qaida no doubt believes that its actions are moral, following a 
> divine plan. Evangelical Christians think they are saving the country from 
> moral decay by "Christianizing" the country in their own image, i.e., what 
> they are doing is not only moral, but crusading for morality. And so on. 
> None of that rises to the level of empirical evidence. It is, as Richard 
> might say, anaikantika (indeterminate), at best.

That is completely irrelevant. There is a need for vyāpti only when one is making a universal affirmative or a universal negative proposition and deducing something from it. I was not making a universal proposition (of the form "All universalist Quakers are concerned with morality"), but a singular proposition (of the form "There are universalist Quakers who are concerned with morality"), which is all that is required to show the falsity of the claim that universalism is always immoral, which seemed to me the intention of you claim that universalism is intrinsically immoral.

> "Speaking truth to power" is an empty slogan, or more acutely diagnosed, a 
> passive-aggressive biased slogan.

As I said, the slogan has come into public discourse and is used in ways different from the way it was used by 18th century Quakers and is still used by 21st century Quakers. As Quakers use it, it means what I said it means.

> Since that honor is bestowed on people like Ahmadinejad

But never uncategorically. If one says about one speech given by one man on one occasion that the speech was an example of speaking truth to power, it does not follow that one is saying that everything that person says on every occasion is an example of speaking truth to power. If one admires one thing that a person has done, it does not follow that one admires everything that person does. Similarly, one one believes that some (even most) of a person's actions are vicious, it does not follow that one believes the person in question has no virtues at all.
I don't think one needs to have studied very much logic to be aware of that.

Now if you will go back and check the archives, you'll find that I agreed with Ahmadinejad that it is unfair for the United States, which still has tens of thousands of nuclear warheads (and is the only country that has actually USED them, if you'll recall), to condemn Iran and Korea for aspiring to develop nuclear weapons. I still think he's right. It is unfair. But then I advocate universal nuclear disarmament, meaning that I am in favor of NO country having a nuclear arsenal. You may recall, that is the argument of the Quaker pamphlet of the 1950s entitled "Speaking truth to power," which for better or for worse brought the phrase back into common usage. 

> Note, 
> I am NOT making value judgments about the content, and not suggesting that 
> Wenders is a more worthy recipient of the honor than Ahmadinejad, but merely 
> suggesting that the phrase 'speak truth to power' is a misnomer, since that 
> 'truth' has an agenda; by concealing the agenda so as to be able to claim 
> deniability makes it passive-aggressive (that is what passive-aggressive 
> means, e.g., why the KKK wear hoods).

You are right. The "truth" in the Quaker phrase has an agenda behind it. The opinion elevated, perhaps without warrant, to the level of a truth is that when power is abused by anyone for any reason, people and other living beings suffer, and when that happens, people should speak up about it and try to prevent such things from happening. The usual aim if Quakers is not to conceal that agenda, but to state it as clearly as possible, and to act on it whenever there is a need. There is nothing passive about it, for it is a call to activism. And one hopes it is not aggressive, since it is a call to end aggression by non-violent means. I personally have never see a Quaker on a peace march wearing a hood as KKK people do, and I have been on quite a few peace marches, but perhaps I need to get around more. Please send pictures of hooded Quakers if you have any.

I think you are laboring under one further bit of information, which is that "Speak truth to power" is never used to call into question the actions of anyone but the United States and Israel. That is simply false. As I said, whenever power is being abused by anyone with the result of people suffering, you will hear Quakers and other unhooded people concerned with justice speaking out about it. All you have to do is listen.

> So my original charge, that universalism and relativism lead to immoralism 
> stands.

Sorry, but it does not. At the very most you can say that it is possible for a universalist to be immoral. But you have not established (and can't establish, given that it is empirically false) that universalism entails immorality or that universalism is intrinsically immoral.

> As for "pluralism" as a 
> preferable term/concept, the only thorough-going pluralists would be 
> anarchists and hermits. All the rest are compromising or delusionally 
> imagining that the Other they tolerate shares on some important level 
> something in common with them, in which case it is no longer pluralism but 
> monadic monism -- an obvious contradiction in terms (or, as Joanna prefers, 
> paradox).

My own view on human psychology is that it is rarely easy to know exactly what others and thinking and feeling. My own preference would be to avoid making wholesale claims about the motivations of others. On the face of it, your claim has something in common with the notorious British imam who said not long ago that the only genuine Muslims are those who are striving to convert every last human being on the planet to Islam and who are strictly following every last detail of shariah. Every delf-proclaimed Muslim who believed otherwise, he said, was compromising or delusional.

> In the real world usually the "idea" of pluralism becomes quickly 
> disenchanted when encountering real plurality and heterogeneity.

Well, that has not been my experience. I have embraced a pretty strong pluralism my entire life and have never grown tired of real diversity and heterogeneity. It never occurs to me that underlying diversity there is a deep psychological or epistemological or metaphysical unity; in that respect I differ from universalists and monists. There are people who believe that variety is not the spice of life but the very stuff of life; such people are also aware that not everyone shares that conviction, and are not in the least discomforted thereby.

> Ergo 
> banning ritual slaughter to discourage Muslims (so what if Jews are also 
> inconvenienced!)

If we can believe Lidewij Niezink(who may not count as independent empirical evidence, since he is, after all, Dutch), the motivation behind the new Dutch law was to save animals from suffering, not to discourage Muslims or Jews. Indeed, we learned that if anyone can provide independent scientific evidence that his or her way of slaughtering animals does not cause them (the animals) more suffering than if they (the animals) were stunned, then the person showing the proof can proceed to kill the animal without first stunning it (the animal). Of course, you and I would prefer a law saying that no one can kill an animal unless he (the would-be killer) can provide scientific proof that killing does the animal no harm. But who listens to us?

> Or, in New York City, Puerto Ricans complain when Dominicans move into their 
> neighborhood. And on and on...

I trust you are saying that there are some Puerto Ricans who issue such complaints, and I am guessing you find such complaints irrational. So you have just recently discovered that there are some irrational human beings? So I guess maybe we are not essentially homo sapiens after all.

Richard




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