[Buddha-l] (no subject)

[Bob Woolery]

Possibly relevant here is the Samkhya scheme, as laid out in the Tattva Samasa of Kapila.  _Manas_, usually translated mind, is a purely mechanical organizer of sense and action.  _Ahamkara_, the I-maker is the relevant part when describing transcendental loss of sense of self.  Then there is _buddhi_ the part of the phenomenal contents of a human that is in sync with the flow of a three dimensional continuum into the realm of time.  These at least are what I recall of Kitselman's elucidation.

   

Bob Woolery, DC
326 deAnza dr
Vallejo, CA  94589
www.stateoftheartchiro.com
(707)557 5471
 

-----Original Message-----
From: buddha-l-bounces at mailman.swcp.com [mailto:buddha-l-bounces at mailman.swcp.com] On Behalf Of Erik Hoogcarspel
Sent: Monday, November 29, 2010 7:30 AM
To: Buddhist discussion forum
Subject: Re: [Buddha-l] (no subject)

Op 29-11-10 15:40, Jackhat1 at aol.com schreef:
> In a message dated 11/29/2010 7:39:57 A.M. SA Western Standard Time,
> stefan.detrez at gmail.com writes:
>
> Yes,  working selves. As already mentioned it takes a self to lose it.  It
> consider it as a 'disposable' self. My observation of anatta as a  concept
> is
> not entirely clear. At times anatta is specifically aiming at  brahmanist
> notion of an endurable self, whereas at other times I get the  impression
> that the self is understood as the person's  personality.
> ===
> Understanding anatta conceptually is hard to understand. Experientially
> it's not so hard. Most people that have gone on a retreat realize it however
> briefly. During meditation, thoughts and sensations arise and pass away
> without  our being able to discern the "I" that directs them. After sitting
> meditation we  stand up to go into walking meditation. This very complex action
> happens by  itself without an "I" to direct it.
>
> I think anyone who plays a sport or a musical instrument experiences the
> same thing. Serving a tennis ball or playing a violin well involves getting
> out  of the way to let it happen.
I don't agree with this. One can feel things which don't exist and the 
other way around. The word 'I' is a grammatical form and since no 
substantially existing she or we can be found, why would this be the 
case with I? Now the Upanișads talk about an ātman who is knowable and 
knowing, Christians would call this a soul. Buddhists generally deny 
that such an object-subject exists.
Kant came with a distinction between an empirical ego that can become 
sick, sad or happy and a transcendental one. The first one exists 
conventionally, like the Buddha-l. No matter how hard you look, you 
cannot tell where it is, but you can talk about it as if it exists 
somewhere and you can give it a therapy or a birthday present. This is 
also the one which you can loose (Nāgārjuna would protest: if something 
really belongs to you, you cannot loose it; if something does not belong 
to you, you cannot loose it either).
The other one exists logically. I may not be aware of it, but the I who 
writes this answer has to be the same as the one who has read the post 
in the first place. Kant thought this ego to be continuous and the same 
and not subject to circumstances. It is somewhat similar to the concept 
of karma. An interesting question would be whether this transcendental 
ego exists conventionally or metaphysically.

erik
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