[Buddha-l] Batchelor

[Dan Lusthaus]

Joy, Erik, et al.,

The World as Will and Representation is one of those works reaching for 
system post-Spinoza, such as attempted by Schelling, Hegel, etc., though for 
Schopenhauer his guiding light was what he understood Buddhism to be, based 
on the limited sources available early in the 19th c. His vision of Buddhism 
influenced Nietzsche early on, who understood Buddhism through 
Schopenhauerian eyes. Nietzsche's critiques of Buddhism are related to his 
eventual rejection of Schopenhauer for, among other things, being too 
nihilistic and negative. The philosophy Nietzsche moved to, I would argue, 
was actually closer to authentic Buddhism, though he didn't fully recognize 
that (though he did follow the developments in Buddhist studies during his 
time).

Neitzsche took Rousseu's advice, apparently: "Sors de l'enfance, ami, 
réveille-toi !"  and outgrew Schopenhauer.

Incidentally, Erik's observations on Batchelor and Sartre are on target.

One minor correction. Contingency is not the opposite of causal. That would 
be "accident" or random. In the Greek and medieval systems (i.e., 
Aristoteleanism), there are three levels: Necessity, Contingency, and 
Accident.

Necessity concerns causes leading ineluctably to their effects, or, in terms 
of formal causes, what is necessarily the case. Contingency happens for 
reasons, has causes, but the results *could have been otherwise*. Accidental 
means no rhyme or reason, absence of any sort of causal necessity at all.

So, by Aristotelean lights, that a "human" is a "rational animal" is 
necessary. That she was born on a particular date, or has hair of a 
particular color, is contingent. Only anarchists and Western Carvakas argue 
for accidents. The essential nature of something is "necessary." Whatever 
could be otherwise (she could have been a he, had red hair instead of brown, 
been born on a Tues. instead of a Wed., etc.) is contingent. That she has 
brown hair, happened for reasons, but that was not necessary. The fact of 
birth and death is necessary, but the facts of anyone's particular birth and 
death are contingent. Buddha understood the twelve links as necessary, not 
contingent. Because there is death, there necessarily is birth. And so on.

I don't think that distinction sheds any light on pratitya-samutpada.

If Batchelor means "contingent" in a less professional manner, as a 
substitute for "tentative" (contingency plans in case X happens -- "if this, 
then that"), then he is not doing pratitya-samutpada justice and just 
confusing things by borrowing a word that is already overburdened with 
baggage.

Dan