[Buddha-l] Non-arising

[Dan Lusthaus]

Hi Richard,

> Note that this argument embeds an assumption that's crucial to its
> effectiveness, and that's also easy to miss: "attainment of nirvana" =
> "nirvana." In other words: there's no important distinction to be
> drawn between attaining X and X itself. X _just is_ the attainment of
> X.

What else is nirvana but an attainment? Should we think of it as a place? A 
thing? A locus? A dimension? A psychological condition?

The use of words for "attainment" in these contexts is ubiquitous in 
Buddhist texts.

> Perhaps this is true in the case of nirvana.

Very important qualification. Not only "perhaps," but necessarily.

>But it hardly seems
> convincing more generally. Compare: a medal won at an Olympic event
> can be melted down. Is the same true of its attainment?

That's because the medals (and their attaiment) arise and cease due to 
causes and conditions.

This also helps illustrate what I consider an important difference between 
Indian "logic" (up to Dharmakirti) and modern western formal logics. The 
latter insist on contentless structure -- converting statements into 
mathematical formulas is not only possible but encouraged. Indian logics do 
not divorce from content (hence the importance of the darstantika --  
inclusive and exclusionary examples). What determines the validity of an 
Indian syllogism is not mere formal structure, but distribution of content 
across the statements, whether the paksadharma is or isn't included in the 
hetu and sapaksa or vipaksa. That cannot be decided formally, but according 
to the content of each statement. 99% of the secondary literature on Indian 
logic fails to recognize that very basic point.

Those that do are hesitant to call what the Indians did "logic."

Dan