[Buddha-l] What is direct experience?
Stefan Detrez
stefan.detrez at gmail.com
Thu Dec 2 13:48:21 MST 2010
>
> > Thanks. Something I've wondered about it whether a realization of anatta
> leads one to better understanding of the conventional I; though Nishitani
> does mention the cogito it's not, obvious, in what way he thinks it is
> clarified. As far as I can remember he just says that there are incompetent
> ways to deny it. Also, whether one's practice or understanding is not
> helpful if we think that some kind of self is useful in our existential
> pursuits... Thank you for the replies and I hope I have not been a bother!
> >
> There has been a lot of discussion about this. The problem is that
> direct knowledge is considered to be preconceptual. Now in karate and
> other martial arts you use the 'knowledge' of your body (if you're a
> beginner you just have to run as fast as you can without thinking).
> Using concepts just takes too long.
>
Maybe it serves the discussion to launch a homemade term called 'non-verbal
conceptualization', which is a instantaneous cognitive process without words
springing consciously to mind, but remain subconscious. The way I sense this
non-verbal conceptualization is much like intuition, eventhough intuition
has a more emotional feel to it. And if conceptualization cannot occur
without words, than non-verbal conceptualization is a contradiction.
> But how do I know without concepts that I'm in front of a screen or that
> my keyboard is black? My fingers 'know' the keystrokes, but the color of
> my keyboard is something I know and become aware only by using the
> concept 'black'. The difference between the knowledge of my fingers and
> proper knowledge like that of the color of my keyboard is that I can
> tell it to others. How can you call something knowledge if you cannot
> explain what you know? So many use the concept 'knowledge' in a kind ofW
> loose sort of way and use metaphors without realizing it. This makes the
> discussion very awkward. I guess the goal of Buddhism is not a kind of
> knowledge but an ontological awareness. This does more justice to the
> famous metaphor of the finger and the moon.
>
>
Suppose we couple this ontological awareness to what Collins in his
aforementioned book would call 'a taboo on the self.' Can direct knowledge
then be called knowledge attained through 'deselved' perception?
Stefan
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