[Buddha-l] Belief and metaphysics

[Jayarava]

Hi Robert,

A more fundamental problem with what you are saying has occurred to me. You say:

> My assumption is much more subtle than this: that a?belief which cannot > conceivably?be tested,?whether in terms of?individual or shared 
> experience, whether the test is one of verification or falsificatio n or > even fruitful application, leads us away from conditions and towards 
> dogma and attachment. It is only those kinds of belief that are not good > for us: provisional beliefs, on the other?hand,?are positively required. > This is not a metaphysic but a physic, a?provisional means of curing us > of metaphysics.

On the one hand you argue that metaphysical beliefs are always problematic, something we need to be "cured" of. On the other hand you argue that metaphysical beliefs "leads us away from conditions and towards dogma and attachment" - that is to say you propose a causal relation between metaphysical beliefs and dogmatism. But causality is a metaphysical concept! So you cannot employ it in your argument without contradiction. If you do away with metaphysics then one thing cannot lead to another! Hume's dilemma.

You also state that metaphysics or metaphysical beliefs can be "appreciably false" - this kind of true/false distinction is also metaphysical, isn't it?

So in fact your own arguments rest on metaphysical concepts. Take them away and the whole thing falls down.

This seems to be the main problem with rejecting all metaphysics. In fact, as I understand Kant proposed, the idea of causation is useful and can be fruitfully employed. As can other metaphysical concepts like space and time. I think we can also usefully employ a metaphysic of true and false. These may well lead to dogmatism, but they continue to be useful. 

Perhaps you dealt with these issues in your PhD but it's not clear that you have solved the problem in your writing here. 

Best wishes
Jayarava