[Buddha-l] Prominent Neobuddhist proposes religionbasedblacklisting for government jobs

[Dan Lusthaus]

Richard wrote:

>>until Dignaga, following the Vaisesika,
>> abandoned it in
>> favor of pratyaksa and anumana alone.
>
> This is not quite accurate. Dignāga did not abandon āpta-vacana. He
> simply subsumed it under anumāna.

Why interrupt culture war diatribes with appeals to accuracy concerning 
Buddhism? But to be accurate -- and pedantic -- this subsumation of 
apta-pramana under anumana and pratyaksa was already taken as standard by 
Asanga (in Abhidharmasamuccaya). Exactly how Dignaga navigated this has been 
the subject of some discussion in the secondary literature. Reasonable 
readings have been proposed for a variety of options to be attributed to 
Dignaga. The matter is not settled conclusively IMO, and, in fact, I 
somewhat agree with Richard that in his heart of hearts Dignaga was not 
interested in jettisoning buddhavacana -- only forcing Buddhists to leave it 
at the door when engaging in intra-religious debate.


>> Dharmakirti takes this limitation even more seriously than did
>> Dignaga.
>
> Again, not quite so. Unlike Dignāga, Dharmakīrti devoted an entire
> chapter of his "commentary" on Dignāga's work to showing that the
> Buddha's words are authoritative. Rather than saying, however, that
> doctrines are true because the Buddha said them, he argued that the
> Buddha is an authority because everything he said can be shown to be
> true.

That is precisely HOW he resolves to take it seriously: recontextualize and 
redefine it.

>> Yet, I am unaware of any instance in which this epistemological
>> parsimony resulted in his challenging and subsequently rejecting
>> well-established Buddhavacana
>
> The only well-established Buddhist doctrines that Dharmakīrti dealt
> with were the four noble truths and the doctrine of karma and rebirth.
> He claimed that the four noble truths could all be established
> empirically, and he said that arguments against rebirth are not
> compelling.

Well, I can think of a few more. His rejection of attributing omniscience to 
Buddha was courageous -- even if rooted in Agama (if not Mahayana). That is 
one of the things I admire him for.

>> -- so a tacit apta-pramana remains in force.
>
> There is nothing tacit about it. It is the explicit subject matter of
> an entire chapter of Pramāṇavārttikam.

Well it is obviously tacit, since, as you show above, you missed his tacit 
point, which was to justify a particular set of apta-pramana by pretending 
it can be validated by the two legitimate pramanas. It's not true because 
it's Buddhist, it's Buddhist because it's true. How much Buddhism would 
survive a rigorous application of that admirable standard?

> The side of Dharmakīrti that I find less than compelling is manifested
> in 1) his attempt to show that external objects do not exist, a topic
> to which he devotes quite a lot of space in his chapter on pratyakṣa,
> and 2) his defense of yogi-pratyakṣa in that same chapter.

Hmmm. If that's all you find disturbing, you could always become a 
Naiyayika. (Maybe you already are? They believe in afterlife, however.)

>
> Aside from that, and you false claim that coyotes have used ad hominem
> arguments against you, and your incompetent analysis of Nāgārjuna, I
> pretty much agree with some of what you said.

More high praise. Wily coyote setting bait or are his whiskers turning grey 
and soft?

Dan