[Buddha-l] Fsat Mnifdlunses?

[Dan Lusthaus]

[Lusthaus]
>> but, after due consideration, when
>> it is determined that someone is simply wrong, it is important to
>> point that
>> out.
>
[Richard's reply]
> If there are practical consequences, yes.

One tenet already highlighted in the Pali texts, and increasingly expanded 
upon in subsequent Buddhist developments, is that all drsti -- including the 
trivial ones -- have consequences. After all, they are actions of mind, and 
can be expressed in speech or bodily activity. Are the consequences 
"practical"? Standard Buddhist karmic theory (which we know Richard does not 
accept) says yes. If the consequence is not immediately and directly obvious 
now, it is nonetheless consequential somewhere down the road -- and 
depending on the type of action, it might affect not only the doer, but also 
those being done to, or those who were part of the situation who either 
committed or neglected to commit adjacent actions.

That is not an excuse to rail against everybody for everything. But it does 
mean that from time to time, esp on important issues (with or without 
obvious "practical" consequences -- do we really need to take a detour into 
how many ways we can define and determine the meaning of "important"?) there 
is not only nothing wrong in drawing the line, but it may be one's 
responsibility, whether one "feels" like it, or not.

That said, let's go back to what I originally said: "after due 
consideration, when it is *determined*..." I recall Richard asking awhile 
back on this list about ni"scaya -- its meaning, its role in Dharmakirti' 
epistemology, etc. The current discussion seems to be a revisiting of 
Richard's previous uncertainty, since ni"scaya means to make a 
determination, reach a judgement, not as an isolated event, but because that 
becomes a basis (aa"sraya, etc.) for subsequent actions, such as progressing 
on the Path, or pursuing a goal successfully.

The practical consequences of getting Yogacara wrong is that the valuable 
and carefully forged teachings contained in that school's literature get 
obstructed and obscure by misleading representations. That is a metonymy of 
the problem Yogacara itself identified as the root of duhkha. That is 
parikalpa. That they weren't better tacticians at constructing a way to get 
their point across that would circumvent the propensity for misreading that 
readers will bring to the texts, since they were aware of that on many 
levels, is their great failure.

If one assumes for a moment that:
(1) The Buddhist path offers things to do that are worthwhile doing;
(2) Yogacara -- which offers the most detailed exposition of the path, 
incorporating the teachings of most other Buddhists -- has *practical* 
advise and guidance to offer.
(3) Distorting what they offer renders their contribution useless.

then, correcting how they are viewed is analogous to correcting cognition, 
which is what Yogacara, Buddhists in general, and even most Indians, are 
about.

Buddha did not have the laissez-faire attitude toward drstis that Richard 
does. Poor Sati, who was the first "Buddhist" to hold the erroneous 
interpretation of Yogacara in Buddhist history, was too stubborn to relent 
that view when corrected by fellow monks, who eventually reported him to 
Gotama, who brought him in and made him wear the dunce cap, declaring (1) 
that is NOT my (Buddha's) position, and (2) it is pernicious. 
(Mahaa-ta.nhaa-sankhaya sutta, MN #38)
http://tinyurl.com/r3tzj3



>Nor can any harm at all come from thinking
> that there are realities outside the mind, or in thinking that some
> Yogācāra thinkers denied that there is a material world that exists
> independent of any awareness of it.

If that were so then so many Buddhists would not have lavished so much 
attention on precisely those issues. Or are we accusing them of being the 
dawdlers?

Why drstis on those issues can be pernicious is that the entail projections, 
appropriativeness, desires, vedana, and the whole gamut of conditioning 
factors discussed by Buddhists under the rubric of pratitya-samutpada. Of 
course, Richard doesn't quite believe in pratitya-samutpada -- or think it 
makes sense -- either.

> I much prefer dawdling to undertaking utterly pointless work.

Are those the only options?

>> Yogacara was not idealism in the sense most people repeatedly claim.
>> That is
>> simply a fact.
>
> You have more confidence than I that there is a fact to the matter. In
> such issues as this, I see many opinions, but I see nothing that comes
> even close to a fact.

Stop reading all the secondary literature, pick up a copy of the 
Yogacarabhumi and start on page one. When you've reached the last page 
report back to us on exactly how many "idealistic" passages you have found. 
I've give you $1000 for each one.

Or if YBh is too large, how about Abhidharmasamuccaya? Same offer. You can 
even search through Sthiramati's commentary on AS to find the money-winner.

Of course, you won't do that. Ergo, all you see is others' opinions, no 
facts. (mostly opinions offered by others who also have not done the basic 
homework).

> How presumptuous of you to think you can know the motives of the
> opponents of Yogācāra.

Oh, please! What interesting posturing! As you know, having read enough of 
this literature, motives are rarely clean nor hidden. One would have to be 
blind not to recognize them. It requires no presumption. If memory serves, 
one the things you find distasteful about Dharmakirti is his blatant 
polemicism.

> I guess it's not so obvious to me that those folks (Pereira, Eliade,
> C.A.F. Rhys Davids et al.) were wrong.

Still need to work on the ni"scaya stuff, Richard.


>I can see merit in their view,
> as I can see merit in the view that some Buddhists tried to stake
> their turf by holding a view that no one else held, even if the view
> flew in the face of all evidence.

Both Eliade and Pereira hold that Buddha held a pretty standard atmavada 
view, though he was occasionally coy with how he expressed it, preferring 
via negative language (neti neti). Eliade makes the more seductive case, and 
hence the more pernicious. Pereira's misuse of the Pali material is so 
obvious to those sufficiently familiar with the lit., that he posed no or 
little danger.

>Collins seems to hold a position a
> bit like that. All the sensible views of self had been taken, so if he
> wanted to take a number that hadn't already been taken, the Buddha had
> to deny the self. A clever marketing ploy, nothing more than that.

As you know, in the last decade or so it has become very popular, esp. among 
British or Anglo-influenced philosophers, to argue that Buddhism (by which 
they almost invariably mean Nikaya Buddhism) rejects a "substance" view of 
self, but embraces a "process" view of self (which, not surprisingly, 
parallels recent developments in Anglo philosophy and Psychology). All very 
attractive, until one reads enough Buddhist lit. to see that such options 
were already evident to the Buddhists who, with sound reasoning, rejected 
those options.

These are fun (or annoying) games to play -- amusing ways to dawdle. But 
eventually one has to reach a ni"scaya and move on. Or else one doesn't move 
on.

>In
> the final analysis, I don't think it matters in the slightest.

Here we completely disagree. But since you are not ceding my point, I guess 
it does matter to you after all.

>So I
> think your sense of duty is the pathetic strutting of a man in need of
> a great cause to fight for.

Absolutely. That's why I insist Buddhadom owes the pudgalavadins a huge 
apology.

Dan