[Buddha-l] A question for Jewish Buddhists

[Dan Lusthaus]

Richard,

> When Jewish people take up Buddhism, do they experience a conflict
> over this teaching about the relative seriousness of an indiscretion
> depending on the overall character of the person being indiscreet?

(Speaking for myself, and not JuBus everywhere): Not necessarily this
specific example, but related issues in the specifics of Buddhist karmic
theory. This particular problem stems -- at least in part -- from a
fundamental different starting point in assumptions. Buddhists have tended
to glorify, even deify, certain humans (think HHDL), and thus are eager to
overlook "minor" discretions, and, when push comes to shove, major
discretions as well (think of Chan masters killing students who sneak out
for a midnight libation or beheading felines just to make a ridiculous
point).  Jewish tradition, on the other hand, emphasizes the imperfection of
all humans, and thus a great deal of attention is paid to Moses'
transgression (hitting a rock when merely talking to it would have been
sufficient) and the serious consequences that attached to that. Thus the
more you should know better, the less forgivable a transgression will be.

But this is only the tip of a much larger iceburg. Karma is, ostensibly,
tied to intent, intention (intention is also important in Jewish
jurisprudence, but it is not the sole criterion; one is expected to the
right thing whether one "feels like it" or not). An action acquires karmic
significance only when intent is involved (intent is a technical term for
desire, or certain kind of desire). Hence, one can make excuses for the
bigshot's indiscretion since he must have had a "higher" intent in doing so.
"Intention" as a criterion, however, gets diluted and distorted in
multifarious ways. Theravada monks avoid eating meat "intended" for them by
passing their plate one to the left, so the plate now in front of them would
not be considered "intended" for them. Absurd! And food rules is one of the
places Buddha himself (or at least the Buddha who appears in the Pali
vinaya) started to mess with the rules (had he been more fastidious, he
wouldn't have died of trichonosis). Connected with the assumption in the
previous query about insight and belief translating into observable
behavior, Arhats are supposed to be beyond kle"sa, etc. (otherwise what
benefit would arise from attaining arhatship?), but, as the Buddhist sources
themselves well document, Arhats got themselves embroiled in all sorts of
scandalous behavior, leading to controversies within Buddhist groups as to
the status of Arhats (nicely side-stepped by Mahayana by cleaning off a new
label, Bodhisattva). Anyone familiar with Buddhist bigshots these days knows
that, while there are some admirable folks in those ranks, the scandals and
scandalous behaviors have not subsided. While readers of the vinaya know
there are all sorts of minor infractions that can bring down serious
censuring if one is a minor figure, rarely do the bigshots get censured (or
worse) for their often very public indiscretions.

One place to see this form of Buddhist "forgiveness" in nearly extreme form
is Bhavaviveka's Madhyamakah.rdaya (sections of which have translated by
David Eckel and should be out soon). The great Bodhisattva who commits
murder must, by karmic dictates, go to hell, but he never really touches
down there, much less spends any time in penal penance, since as he gets
close he wafts away like a light piece of silk falling toward a fire. In
another chapter (not translated by Eckel in the forthcoming volume, but
available in Skt) Bh. chides Hindus (Mimamsikas in particular) for being
vegetarian, in an embarrassing (for a Buddhist) rant ridiculing them for
being squeamish about eating animal flesh.

On the surface level, "intent" as a sole criterion cannot deal with
"ignorance of the law" violations (except to attribute "hidden" motives to
such actions, which opens all sorts of worm cans). On the level of systemic
entailments, all sorts of excuses and formulaic dliutions were constructed,
from a strict calculus of x number of deeds of such-and-such kusala variety
vs. x number of akusala deeds, for a final tabulation, which mechanizes
behavior to the point of making intent in its original sense almost an
afterthought; to higher motives from lower misdeeds.

I could go on and on, but the point should be clear by now...

Dan