[Buddha-l] Sabba Sutta

[Dan Lusthaus]

Richard Hayes wrote:

> No one has disputed the claims you made. They are, as you have said,
> very well know to scholars of Jung.

Forgive me for thinking that when what I wrote about Jung is labeled
"unreliable" I take that to mean that I am making unwarranted claims.
Apparently in your vocabulary "unreliable" does not mean unreliable. It
means you don't like what I said, or wish I hadn't said it.

> From what I have seen in those works,
> there is hardly anything that Dignāga has in common with the allagedly
> Yogācāra ideas presented there.

Awhile back, we conducted a Yogacara Seminar at the AAR. Seminars (as
opposed to Groups, Consultations, etc.) have a five-year life span, a
limited membership, and are supposed to allow scholars working on a common
project to meet and discuss that project. I was the respondent to a group of
fine papers the first year, papers on Ratnakirti, Sthiramati, Tsongkhapa,
and Vasubandhu. As part of my response, and in subsequent email discussion
after the meeting, I suggested the following:

---
In my response I suggested that it may be time to replace the standard
'textbook' synopsis of Yogacara - namely, an enumeration of 8
consciousnesses and 3 svabhaavas - and instead develop something that I
argue is structurally at the core of each of the papers, to wit:
Starting with the assumption that

(1) some sort of untainted cognitive activity free from erroneous qualities
is accessible to humans - the nature and characteristics of which may or may
not differ across the papers

(2) various sorts of discriminations and linguistic-conceptual additions are
introduced that complicate cognitive activity, so much so that

(3) the problems these complications produce must be overcome.

(4) The method or recommendations for overcoming these problems, again, may
or may not be the same for all the texts and thinkers presented or
represented by these papers, but one problem that emerges with the
discriminative, linguistic-conceptual problems is the notion - and even
phenomenological experience - of externality.

Is this a better structural introduction to Yogacara than the 8
consciousnesses and 3 svabhavas? (i.e., does it explain why they develop
those - and all the additional categories, from 100 dharmas abhidharma, to
vijnapti-matra, to rigorous epistemology and logic, etc. - in the first
place?)
----

Was I being crazy or unreliable to propose this, or might there be some
justification? In the group discussion that responded, part of Charles
Muller's reply was:

---
... it is clear that there are Yogacara scholars of solid reputation who
prefer to introduce Yogacara with an approach much closer to that espoused
by Dan. Just grabbing a copy of Takasaki Jikido's Yuishiki nyuumon
(Introduction to Consciousness-only) off of my shelf, I see that he has
arranged his presentation with the following structure of chapters and
subtopics:

I. What is mistaken discrimination?
a. The Madhyaanta-vibhaaga
b. Mistaken discrimination and emptiness of nature
c. The subjective and objective views
d. The middle way and the three natures
e. The nature of emptiness and existence.

II. The Structure of Cognition
a. The manifestation of consciousness
b. From delusion to awakening
c. The three natures
d. The role of emptiness in consciousness-only

III. The Process of Awakening
a. The entry into enlightenment through the mark of nothingness.
b. The attainable and the unattainable

IV. Consciousness and dependent origination
a. The essence of false discrimination
b. The two kinds of consciousness (alaya and transforming)
c. Dependent origination within the consciousnesses.
d. Consciousness and atman

V. The operation of Consciousness. (the sub-sections of which deal
extensively with the alaya)
a. The transformation of consciousness
b. The functions of consciousness
c. The continuity of the individual and transmigration

VI. Theories of religious cultivation in Consciousness-only.
a. The stages of practice.
b. The possibility of enlightenment.
c. Madhyamika's critique of Yogacara.

As we can see, Takasaki does not get to the topic of the eight
consciousnesses until fairly late in the work--and Yogic practice, not until
the end. On the other hand, the three natures are introduced relatively
early.

----

In terms of Dignaga and Dharmakirti, I would add that one of the earliest
serious discussions of hetuvidyaa in Buddhist texts occurs in Asanga's
Yogacarabhumi (and a related, but modified discussion in the
Abhidharmasamuccaya). Tucci, back in 1929, in his study of those portions of
Asanga's text concluded that they are clear precursors of Dignaga (including
Trairupya, etc.). We all know that Dignaga was influenced by Vasubandhu's
hetuvidya writings, though exactly in what ways is not fully understood,
since most of them are no longer extant, or only fragments remain (which
hasn't prevented a great deal of speculation on the topic). I would suggest
going back to Asanga, since we at least have his texts (in Skt, Ch & Tib).
For instance, Dignaga's fourfold structure of pratyaksa (5 senses,
mano-dhatu, svasamvitti of the klesas, and yogin-pratyaksa) is lifted almost
verbatim from Asanga, and I suggested in one of my papers at the recent IABS
that this reflects, respectively, panca-vijnana-kaya, manovijnana, manas and
alayavijnana. Dignaga, as is evident from how he incorporates the notion of
prasiddha into his sadhanas, is seeking an ecumenical vehicle in which all
participants are encouraged to participate by leaving their sectarian
commitments at the door. Hence his Yogacara-leanings are necessarily veiled,
as Jinendrabuddhi understood.

As for the Buddhists I mentioned being "centuries" after the fact, that's
not quite the case. Bhavaviveka was within a century of Dignaga; that he
groups Dignaga with the Yogacaras is significant. More telling (date-wise)
is Xuanzang and Yijing. Xuanzang was in India from ca. 630-644, and never
once mentions Dharmakirti, though he does discuss Dignaga (and translated
some into Chinese subsequently). Yijing arrived in India a quarter of a
century later and informs that Dharmakirti has become an important component
of the curriculum at Nalanda. That indicates that Dharmakirti rose to
prominence in the interim between Xuanzang's and Yijing's visits to India.
Yijing is thus reporting virtually contemporaneously with Dharmakirti (he
tells us Dharmakirti had died recently), informing us that Dharmakirti
revitalized hetuvidya studies, and that Dharmakirti was a Yogacara. Since,
unlike Xuanzang, Yijing did not identify himself as a Yogacara, he should
not be suspected of sectarian bias in that matter. He probably would have
preferred Dharmakirti could be claimed by a different school.

In short, the evidence is there. If you choose not acknowledge it, that's
another story.

Dan Lusthaus