[Buddha-l] Sabba Sutta

[Bruce Burrill]

Again from Bill Waldron, answering the two alaya questions:

there is no single term in cognitive science that corresponds with 
alaya-vijnana other than, perhaps, 'cognitive unconscious,' which is 
probably about right, since in my view alaya-vijnana is not a single 
process at all, but rather a categorical  term for a variety of 
processes. As Asanga says, "although it continuously arises in a 
stream of moments, it is not singular (ekatva)." Yogacarabhumi, 
Derge, #4038 , 4a.5; T.31.1606.580a18.

Hence, it can hardly count as an entity, either. In fact, strictly 
speaking, in the Buddhist view there are no entities at all. But 
there are mental processes that are not conscious, some of which are 
strictly individual and some of which have shared qualities or 
characteristics, not unlike the fact that sugar tastes sweet to most 
people, so if they all eat something sweet then their experiences 
will be similar. Extrapolate this to other aspects of human 
life---such as speaking a common language, having similar emotional 
responses to cultural symbols, or imagining similar things about 
one's own cultural, ethnic or national group---and you end up with a 
sense of common or collective awareness that is nevertheless, like 
all of us eating something sweet, still based in our individual sense 
faculties. I am quite certain that this is also what Jung, for 
example, had in mind with his 'collective unconscious.'

That such collective illusions as nationalism or ethnic identity are 
illusory does not, unfortunately, make them any less effective nor 
any less pernicious. They are the illusions we all, to a greater or 
lesser degree, labor under and whose broader and long-term 
consequences determine much of our collective lives.

Bill Waldron