[Buddha-l] Realism, anti-realism and Buddhism

[Richard Hayes]

On Mon, 2008-05-26 at 05:30 -0400, Dan Lusthaus wrote:

> As for contextualizing one's reading with other works, I wasn't proposing
> that one has to read all the Great Works of Humanity in order to figure out
> one small e e cummings poem, but I do find that all texts are intertextual,
> and that Indian philosophical texts in particular are invariably engaged in
> debates with opponents, often writing in a context that was filled with well
> known stock arguments, many of which are not spelled out explicitly or in
> sufficient detail to alert the uninitiated in the particular texts
> themselves.

For that very reason, I think that everyone who studies a text probably
has something worthwhile to add to our collective understanding of what
the text is saying. Taber has an extensive knowledge of Mimamsa, and his
knowledge of that area makes it very much worth my time to collaborate
with him as I work on Dharmakirti. His portrayal of Vasubandhu as an
idealist stems, I'm sure, from the fact that Mimamsikas took him as one.
I don't see any reason to dismiss their understanding automatically,
although it could turn out that their understanding was deficient in
some way.

> So to read Vasubandhu, one should read his *predecessors* (subsequent
> commentaries can be helpful, but I hold less stock in their ability to offer
> undistorted viewpoints) as well as his other works.

Why hold less stock in the ability of commentators? If one regards those
who follow, say, Vasubandhu as being prone to distort his views, why not
be equally suspicious of Vasubandhu's ability to represent his
predecessors without distortion? And if he distorts his predecessors,
then surely reading them would not offer much insight in what Vasubandhu
was saying, since what he was saying would ipso facto be a distortion of
and therefore different from what they were saying.

Years ago, when I was studying at University of Toronto, I read several
texts with A.K. "Tony" Warder. He was so deeply committed to the view
that the only legitimate way to interpret a text was 1) to read as much
as possible of what the author of the text had read, and 2) to disregard
what commentators wrote, that he would scowl deeply and firmly scold any
student caught consulting a commentary. My own position was that the
best way to get some sense of a text was to 1) read as much as possible
of that the author of the text had read, 2) read as many commentaries as
possible, and 3) read as much as possible of opponents who criticized
the text. Doing all three of those things is practically impossible for
any one person to do in a single lifetime, and for that reason I think
the best work comes of collaborative teams in which every member of the
team has a slightly different perspective and set of skills to bring to
the work.

> Instead of this sort of contextual work, modern readers substitute the
> assumption that he is an idealist, and then try to make the text and its
> arguments personify that, even when it becomes obvious that as arguments for
> idealism what Vasubandhu says is "counterproductive."

First of all, taking Vasubandhu as an idealist is not merely an
assumption. It is how just about all his opponents portrayed him. Those
scholars who approached Vasubandhu by reading texts with Indian pundits
in the 1920s may have fallen into the trap you describe. I think Matilal
did exactly what you are saying that modern scholars do, but he was
coming to see in his last years that Vasubandhu was much more nuanced
than the caricature he refuted. (No small influence on his thinking was
Katsura, and I suspect even I may have played a role in helping him see
that Brahmanical thinkers may have painted Vasubandhu as an idealist for
the simple reason that idealism is so easy to refute. Katsura and I were
both convinced that Vasubandhu was much too smart to have advocated a
position that could be so easily refuted as the straw man the Brahmins
were setting alight.)

> I base my
> estimation of Schmithausen's philosophical acumen on precisely what he says,
> claims, and criticizes, not on who he does or doesn't talk to. He is a sweet
> generous soul, but he holds some very questionable ideas about Yogacara. If
> you are coming to the IABS, and are willing to buy me a triple latte or a
> beer, I'll rattle some of them off for you.

Oddly enough, I base my claim that he has philosophical acumen on the
very same evidence you invoke to show that he has none. I value his
contributions no less than I value yours, and I find both insightful. I
find yours harder to read.

As for the IABS, I have not attended any academic conference since 2000
and probably will never attend one again. And even if I did, I assure
you I would never buy opinions for coffee or beer. Academic opinions,
like sex, should never be bought or sold. (That is a subjective opinion,
not something I take to be a moral fact. I don't believe in moral facts.
I am an anti-realist in the realm of politics, morality, religion and
interpretations of the US constitution.)

> I take the classical Yogacara position (Asanga, Vasubandhu, Sthiramati) to
> be that prior to asraya-paravrtti we are all phenomenalists, in the sense
> you mention, whether we know it or not (and this is roughly equivalent to
> what is also called an epistemological idealist), but after asraya-paravrtti
> we are fully engaged in the world as it is, with all doubts and
> uncertainties eliminated. 

I can think of no idea more ridiculous than that a human being can ever
be "fully engaged in the world as it is, with all doubts and
uncertainties eliminated." To strive for such a state seems to me every
bit as much a waste of time as striving to fly to the moon on gossamer
wings. If this is indeed the Yogacara project, rest assured I will never
sign on.

> For Dignaga (e.g., at the end of
> Alambana-pariksa), he allows things to remain aporetic. Whether that is his
> final thought on the matter, or merely a concession to the constraints of
> the prajnaptic limitations of anumana is hard to say (I suspect the latter,
> but cannot offer an anumana to prove that). Dharmakirti seems to follow the
> same aporetic strategy.

I agree, except that I have no inclinations one way or the other on
whether aporia is a final position or a point along the way. I
personally would like Dignaga better if he were content with aporia, but
I try not to force my personal preferences onto him.

In a recent conversation with Birgit Kellner, she pointed out to me that
one indication that someone is an idealist is his attempting to show
that his position does not entail solipsism. To show that he is not a
solipsist is precisely what Dharmakirti appears to be doing in
Santaanaantarasiddhi. So his writing that text is prima facie evidence
that he regarded himself as an idealist. I strongly resist the
conclusion that Dharmakirti was an idealist, but I have nothing much to
go on aside from my own personal distaste for idealism. (In the realm of
metaphysics, I would love to be a realist.)

> While not an exact fit, some of what Yogacara texts say about the contrast
> between bimba and pratibimba is similar to the noumenal/phenomenal
> distinction. In early Husserlian vocabulary this would correspond with the
> distinction between hyletic data and noema.

Using Husserlian terminology to explain Asanga and Vasubandhu strikes me
as a good example of using the horrendously difficult to explain the
mildly perplexing. I have to confess I have tried at least a dozen times
to make sense of Husserl, but his writing is so opaque and abstract that
I have never been able to make any sense of it at all. 

-- 
Richard Hayes
Department of Philosophy
University of New Mexico