[Buddha-l] Prapanca

[Dan Lusthaus]

Of the 7868 occurrences of the term prapanca (xilun) in the Taisho or
Zokuzokyo, I haven't been able to find a single one where it is being
applied to "someone else" in any manner whatsoever. It comes up in contexts
that list or describe mental problems, used as a synonym or a term related
to kalpanaa, vikalpa, parikalpa.

As Richard knows well, Nagarjuna calls the telos of his own method the
"putting to rest of prapanca" (prapancopasama). It occurs over 1000 times in
the Prajnaparamita corpus translated by Xuanzang; occurs frequently in
Asanga's writings, etc.

Richard proposed understanding prapanca as a dismissable dismissal because
he wanted to dismiss something previously said by others that included the
characterization of prapanca. Bad methodology, bad motive, and bad
conclusion. Junk in, junk out.

W.F. Wong mentioned the Chinese equivalent: xilun. Xi means a play, a drama
put on. For modern sensibilities, we might suggest being "dramatic," making
"a drama" out of something, understanding something by reducing it to a
narrative, a fictitious construction that engages one's mind and emotions.
"Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player who struts and frets his hour
upon the stage and then is heard no more; it's a tale told by idiots, full
of sound and fury, signifying nothing." (Shakespeare).

Etymologically prapanca implies verbal proliferation. Indian thinkers,
taking language seriously, treated the verbal as the conceptual (they used
the term sa.mj~naa to express that). So prapanca implies conceptual
proliferation. For a simple (and too simplistic for Indian usage) example,
Frege, the father the modern Analytic philosophy, claimed that the referent
(Bedeutung) of every proposition is "true/false," by which he meant not only
that any statement might be determined to be either true or false, but that
"true or false" was the actual referent. E.g., "Roger Clemens took steroids"
is "true or false." So the single statement immediately implies not one, but
two possible states of affairs. To explore that statement further elicits
(for some, with passion and commitment) additional statements, which point
to additional doubling of possible states of affairs. Since everything can
be reduced to a proposition (even the proposition that "Everything cannot be
reduced to a proposition"), the entire universe of possible statements, by
this doubling, has doubled the actual universe. Since fictional lines of
thought can further proliferate, in actuality the proliferation is
exponentially greater than mere doubling.

Richard is right to complain that there is a certain ambiguity to the term
prapanca, in that it is often dropped into Buddhist texts without additional
explanation of what, exactly, the term itself refers to -- as if the reader
is expected to already know what it precisely means. For a single example, a
reader may or may not find the following passage from Asanga's
Abhidharmasamuccaya elucidating. This is Sara Boin-Webb's English
translation of Rahula's French version (from a backtranslation into Skt. It
corresponds to Pradhan's 102, 8-13; the Ch Taisho version T.31.692c28-693a4;
Tib: D 117a2-5; P 138a3-6; Tatia's edition of the
Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyakhya [Sthiramati's commentary, to attest the
Sanskrit] 139, 4-26)(prapanca is rendered here as "idle speculation" which
is not an ideal translation):

[After a list of 10 types of vikalpa, Asanga writes:]
{Quote}
What is the absence of discrimination (nirvikalpataa)? In brief, it is
threefold: [1] non-discrimination in contentment (sa.mtu.s.tinirvikalpataa),
[2] non-discrimination in the absence of perverse views
(aviparyaasanirvikalpataa), and [3] non-discrimination in the absence of
idle speculation (ni.sprapa~nca-nirvikalpataa). One should consider these
three kinds as pertaining respectively to the ordinary man (p.rtagjana), the
disciple ("sraavaka) and the bodhisattva. Non-discrimination in the absence
of idle speculation should not be understood as non-thought (amanasikaara),
or as going beyond thought (manasikaarasamatikrama) or as appeasement (vyupa
"sama), or as own-nature (svabhaava), or as a mental construction concerning
an object (aalambane abhisa.mskaara), but as a mental non-construction
concerning an object (aalambane anabhisa.mskaara).
{endquote}

Though defining the negative case (ni.s-prapanca) rather than the positive,
one can infer the inverse implications (it is Asanga's propensity for using
negative definitions of the most crucial terms that was one of the major
inspirations for Dignaga's apoha theory, I believe). Prapanca here is a type
of vikalpa that is abhisamskara, i.e., conceptualized, ideational, mentally
constructed, implying conceptualization that is conditioned, habitual
(samskara). It is evaluative in the sense that neither ordinary people nor
sravakas are considered capable of doing away with it completely. Only
Bodhisattvas can do that.

As for its use in the hetuvidya literature that Richard mentioned, his take
on that might be right, but there is another possibility. Debate is not
solely about logical coherence, but about articulation, hesitation, verbal
proficiency, etc. I've tended to see the fault of prapanca in this context
as someone who, finding himself in trouble, begins to rant, to overtalk, to
say too much, which may or may not make sense, but, in short, to display his
discomfort and nervousness by verbally overcompensating, going on tangents,
etc.. That's the giveaway that he's lost it, and such a display renders him
a loser of the debate.

Dan Lusthaus