[Buddha-l] Are we sick of dogma yet? (2nd of 2)

[L.S. Cousins]

Richard,

>2. Reductionism would be the view that it makes sense to speak of a
>self, but only insofar as "self" is a convenient shorthand for a complex
>of phenomena that it would be cumbersome to mention in full detail. The
>concept of self could, in principle be eliminated, but at a cost. (In
>another context we might say that "buddha-l" is a convenient shorthand
>for the 500 or so people who subscribe to this discussion group, and for
>the messages that appear on this discussion group. So when we say
>"Buddha-l is a waste of time," this is a shorthand way of saying "All
>the messages written by Dan Lusthaus and Richard Hayes and Lance Cousins
>and [name every subscriber by name] is a waste of time.") Siderits sees
>much of early Buddhism (Theravada, Vaibhasika, Sautraantika etc) as
>reductionist in this sense.

The list should surely include Madhyamaka and early Mahaayaana too ?

But I am curious as to Siderits's agenda. The use of the term 
reductionism is so blatantly loaded (worthy of a Jesuit!) that I 
wonder why it has been adopted.

>3. Realism would be the view that the self is fully real in that there
>are predicates that apply to it but that cannot be applied to anything
>else. The self is one of the ultimately real constituents of the world,
>and it would therefore be an intellectual mistake to eliminate it or to
>see it as merely a convenient fiction. (In another context, some
>philosophers hold that consciousness is a sui generis reality that
>cannot correctly be seen as just a metaphorical or careless way of
>speaking about events in the brain.) Siderits claims that no Buddhists
>were realists about the self, but that one can find self-realists in
>most non-Buddhist schools of Indian philosophy. These are the
>full-fledged aatmavaadins.

I do not understand how either Saam.khya or Advaita Vedaanta could be 
described as realist in this sense.

>Siderits suggests that just as reductionism is a middle path between
>eliminativism and realism, one can find another middle position between
>reductionism and realism. This middle position he calls non-reductive
>mereological supervenience (NMS).

Would it not be more accurate to refer to this as hyper-non-reductive 
super-mereological ultra-supervenience ?

>This view of the self is non-reductive
>in that it regards self as a subject that bears predicates that cannot
>be borne by any of the aggregates.

And they are ?

>  It is mereological in that the self
>is seen as a whole that has parts, namely, the 5 aggregates (or, more
>accurately, all the dharmas that can be classified into aggregates on th
>basis of shared features).

Then you have an unchanging whole and changing parts. Or, you have a 
changing self which is disputed by no school of Buddhism.

>  But the self has a supervenient relationship
>with the dharmas. (The basic idea of supervenient relationship between A
>and B is that it holds just in case every change in A is an effect of
>some change in B. So the concept of self is supervenient upon dharmas
>because no change in the concept of self occurs without some change in
>the underlying dharmas.) The self on this account is an idea (prajnapti)
>but not an idea to which there does not correspond a single uneliminable
>and irreducible reality. Because it is a supervenient reality, it is not
>regarded as simple, unconditioned and eternal; it differs, therefore,
>from the aatman of Brahmanical thought. Siderits argues that at least
>one version of pudgalavaada can best be described as a example of
>non-reductionist mereological supervenience theory.

I suspect that this description has features that had never occurred 
to any Pudgaslavaadin.

>I think that we are now living in a time when it is seen by many people
>as just wrong-headed to say that self or ego is nothing but a poetic way
>of talking about more complex realities.

I would have thought that the whole trend in e.g. neurological and 
memory studies is precisely to see that what appears unified is in 
fact a complex of processes.

>Self is just too important a
>construct in depth psychology and in moral theory to wave it aside.

I am quite happy to wave depth psychology aside. I do not see that 
moral theory is possible with any kind of rigid self.

>  It
>is not simply because of some beginningless delusional habit that we
>think and talk of selves.

Agreed. There are many contributing conditions, but without a 
fundamental misapprehension we would not think about them in the way 
in which we do.

>So our tendency is to be non-reductive about
>self. But we also tend not to see the self as eternal, unconditioned and
>unchanging. Indeed, most of it see self as what analytical philosophers
>call supervenient. By seeing the self as a supervenient reality we can
>speak seriously, and without embarrassment or shame, about such things
>as self-cultivation, self-improvement, self-awareness and
>self-understanding,

While we can use such language, it seems to me that it often feeds 
egoistic aspects of personality which in fact stand in the way of 
cultivation.

>and we can do so without buying into what most of us
>would see as a metaphysical absurdity, namely, an eternal soul or
>something of the like.
>
>Although the terminology of non-reductive mereologial supervenience is
>perhaps unnecessarily arcane,

Agreed

>  the theory for which it stands seems both
>reasonable and attractive to me. Whether or not anyone in India ever
>held such a view---I'm happy to leave it to historians of ideas to sort
>that whole matter out---, I think a number of Buddhists in our times
>hold such a view. If only we could find a less awkward and pompous and
>unattractive name for it. (It's a good job analytic philosophers never
>have children; one shudders to think what ugly names they would give
>them.)

I would have thought such a view to be incompatible with the view 
that the mental is an emergent property of complex physical 
organization (which you sometimes espouse).

Personally, I don't see a problem here. I am happy to see the body as 
an evolving complex of processes (rather than entities); I don't need 
to envisage some over-arching body entity. Nor do I see the need for 
entities rather than processes in describing the mind. Of course, 
these things _are_ convenient some times.

What we do have to bear in mind is that anatta / anaatman in Buddhism 
is a method of meditation, not a philosophical theory. And it is not 
one which is appropriate for the beginning in most cases. Whether you 
call the meditation you do samatha or insight, you must first develop 
mental integration through basic calm meditation. For a long time 
no-self meditation is not an option for most people and could only 
form fixed views if attempted.

Or, to put it another way the purpose of meditation on impermanence 
or unsatisfactoriness or no-self is to arouse disenchantment 
(nibbidaa) with what ever has enchanted the mind. Only after that can 
there be clear seeing.  Enchanted minds see only enchantments.

Lance Cousins