[Buddha-l] Are we sick of dogma yet? (2nd of 2)

[Dan Lusthaus]

(continued from previous message)

>Unfortunately, I lack the Lusthaus
> touch to turn everything into a version of myself, and I also lack his
> ability to see so clearly ...

Unfortunately, unlike prof. Hayes, rather than pretend that ad hominum
caricatures are adequate strategies for avoiding the details of an argument,
I prefer to talk about the texts themselves, and consider accurate
interpretation tantamount. My understanding of the Pudgalavadins is strongly
dependent on, and thus in agreement with Thich's. Perhaps Herr Hayes thinks
he is only a figment of my capricious imagination as well.

> I'm more inclined to agree with Duerlinger and Siderits on this issue than
> with Lusthaus. Their claim is that pudgalavaada is not a form of
reductionism
> at all. Reductionism is the claim that person is merely a designation, a
> convenient shorthand way of talking about something much more complex,

Up to this point, this is EXACTLY the pudgalavadin position, which they
repeatedly argue, insisting that the pudgala is a prajnapti. Please read
Thich's book before taking issue with that (or better, learn Chinese and
read the original texts yourself).

> ...but if
> one were to speak of the more complex reality, there would be no need to
> speak of persons at all.

If this stipulation is allowed, then they are not reductionists, since, as I
mentioned, they consider the heuristic necessary, much as most Mahayana
Buddhists consider upaya necessary (in fact, the Mahayanic upaya rhetoric
develops directly from the Pudgalavadin understanding of prajnapti).

>For a reductionist, when one makes up a final list
> of all the things that truly exist in the full sense of the word, persons
do
> not make the list. Dharmas survive the cut, but persons ultimately get put
> into the dumpster.

You would be surprised to learn that the pudgalavadins would agree with you,
except that the prajnapti "pudgala" serves a soteriological function, and
thus, even though a fiction, serves a necessary purpose, and thus, it
"exists" as fiction, like Sherlock Holmes or Amida Buddha.

> The pudgalavaadins were not reductionists at all, for they maintained that
the
> person DOES make the list of fully existing things and does have
predicates
> that cannot possibly be applied to the dharmas upon which the person is
> supervenient. Dan can quibble all he wants about whether Siderits
understands
> what the Pudagalavaadins really held, and frankly I don't give a damn what
> the historical pudgalavaadins held. History is not my interest in this
> discussion.

So you'd rather invent your own fiction, call it "pudgalavadin," and leave
it at that? One of the things Thich does in his book is, after going through
the four texts and laying out what they claim, their arguments, etc., he
then gives a review of how others (Vasubandhu in the Kosa, Candrakirti,
Kuiji, etc.) have characterized them. Once you know what Pudgalavadins do
hold, and what they took great pains to explain was not their position, one
quickly sees that Vasubandhu's Kosa characterization (which most scholars
depend on) is far of the mark, and that, in fact, most of their opponents
greatly distorted their position in order to more easily dismiss their straw
men (a practice with which prof. Hayes seems to have some empathy). In the
end, only Candrakirti and Kuiji got the pudgalavadin positions correctly.

When Xuanzang visited India he tabulated how many monks lived in the various
monasteries, and what their affiliations were. As Lamotte already noted,
when you tabulate his results, there were more Sammitiyas at that time than
all the rest of Buddhist denominations -- Hinayana and Mahayana -- together!
They were not a deviant minority, but the majority, the mainstream. No
wonder Vasubandhu and others had such a deep anxiety to refute them by any
means. Our version of Buddhist "history" still hardly reflects that
historical reality, and the disappearance of their literature in the Indic
originals (with the paucity of surviving translations that are, themselves,
difficult to read) suggests that the "missionaries" who transplanted what we
think of as Buddhism today in places like China and Tibet, were the
minorities, the "Mormons" of Indian Buddhism. That is not merely of museum
interest, but goes to the heart of how we think about what Buddhism is. That
Santideva was basically a pudgalavadin ("a rose by any other name..."),
though we fail to recognize that, is of importance.

So unless Richard prefers to populate his world with imaginary pudgalavadins
and Lusthauses, while accusing others of projecting their own fantasies on
the world, I would strongly suggest he read Thich's book, and report back to
us whether it gives him a sense of Siderits deja vu.

Dan Lusthaus