Re: [Buddha-l] Niścaya again

[Dan Lusthaus]

Richard,

Here's another thought, if one wishes to play within the domain of Analytic philosophy lingo.

How about instead of differentiating between know that P and be convinced that P, one distinguishes between know that P and know P, the former referring to conceptual knowledge and the latter to the special type of knowing involved in direct perception of discrete particulars (though P in this case would necessarily be nonreducible to linguistic conceptualization)? Perhaps one would, additionally, have to differentiate between P (the momentary, nonconceptual particular) and P1 (the true concepts about that particular).

We're still waiting to hear from you whether ni"scaya applies to both of these types of knowledge. One would also have to clarify whether the correspondence truth theory implied by know that P is fully appropriate for Dharmakirti, or whether a distinction between P and P1 requires something closer to a representational theory of truth.

Dan Lusthaus
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