[Buddha-l] Re: G-d, the D-vil and other imaginary friends

[Richard P. Hayes]

On Wed, 2005-03-16 at 14:07 -0500, Stanley J. Ziobro II wrote:

> If there are, conceptually, sentient beings which lack Buddha nature,
> are they responsible for their misdeeds?

I'm not sure where this idea of icchantikas originated. My main
association with it is the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (Lankaavataara Suutra, for
those whose not using UTF-8). Icchantikas are described there as beings
who have consistently chosen unwholeseome mental states for so long that
they are no longer capable even of thinking of being wholesome. (Note
how I desist from making any Republican jokes here.) The moral of that
story seems to be that icchantikas are responsible for their misdeeds,
since they have become icchantikas as a result of their personal
choices. The logic is rather like what we follow when we hold a person
accountable for his actions while his judgment is impaired as a result
of deliberately becoming intoxicated.

The interesting aspect of icchantika theory is that the sutra goes on to
say that for every icchantika there is a bodhisattva who will not give
up trying to save him. (Sorry for all the sexist language; I am well
aware that girls can be icchantikas, too!) This introduces an element of
grace. 

As one of my former colleagues at McGill observed, grace is the joker in
the deck. If there is a wild card in the deck, then all odds are thrown
off. In Indian philosophy, mixing the doctrine of karma with the
doctrine of God (at least any notion of God that includes such
characteristics as omniscience, omnipotence and perfect compassion) led
to untractable paradoxes about theodicy. The Buddhists exploited these
paradoxes to the hilt when refuting the theory that there is an
omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly compassionate God. If God can alter
the natural course of karma, said the Buddhists, then the fact that some
people are allowed to suffer the ill effects of their bad karma, while
others are not, suggests that God is cruel and capricious (rather like
what some people call a terrorist). On the other hand, if God cannot
alter the natural course of karma, then God is not much better than an
accountant who keeps track of other people's money. So Buddhists tended
to argue that all talk of karma is incompatible with belief in God. And
within Buddhism, similar considerations led some Buddhists to reject
conceptions of buddhahood that made buddhas in important ways like God.

At least one Christian writer I am aware of, Fr. Thomas Hand, SJ, argues
that the doctrine of grace is incompatible with the notion that Christ's
crucifixion was an atonement of sin. Atonement, he argues, is usually
understood as the paying of a debt. Grace, however, is not the payment
of a debt, but rather the forgiving of a debt. One cannot possibly earn
grace, since the very idea of grace is the giving of a gift that one in
no way deserves. This line of thinking would entail the consequence that
grace is also incompatible with karma. So, it would seem, if one wishes
to be consistent, one must make a choice between the doctrine of grace
and the doctrine of karma. To try to hold both can lead only to
confusion

> Historically, it seems that the doctrine was, all things being equal,
> basically either taken as axiomatic or denied to be a coherent concept.

Yes, I think that is true. The doctrine of karma worked pretty well so
long as no one began to ask too many questions about it. Once it is
examined, however, it proves to be quite untenable. One could, of
course, wave one's hands and say "Oh, it is mysterious and beyond all
human understanding. The Buddha even said as much!" But if one takes
that route then one ignores an important tendency in much of Buddhism to
eschew mystery and stick with doctrines that are clear and
comprehensible. Moreover, if one decries critical investigations into
the doctrine of karma on the grounds that it is a mystery than
transcends the human intellect, then one can hardly criticize any other
religion that says that there are mysteries. If, for example, a Buddhist
thinks that karma is a mystery, then it is inconsistent for that
Buddhist to dismiss theories of the world in which God plays a role.

Suppose a Buddhist admits that the doctrine of karma is incomprehensible
and should therefore be rejected. Does the Buddhist thereby cease to be
a Buddhist? This is an issue about which much has been said on buddha-l
during the past fourteen years, but so far no one has said anything on
the topic that comes anywhere near being a compelling argument. In the
absence of compelling arguments, we are reduced to stating our
prejudices to one another. Some choose to whisper their predujices,
others to shriek them.

-- 
Richard Hayes
Department of Philosophy
University of New Mexico