[Buddha-l] Moment of individuation

[Stanley J. Ziobro II]

On Wed, 20 Apr 2005, Richard P. Hayes wrote:

> On Wed, 2005-04-20 at 20:37 -0400, Stanley J. Ziobro II wrote:
>
> > Richard, in your judgment, could differences in interpretation be
> > understood as something other than problems?
>
> Of course. I have no problem at all with differences of interpretation.
> The only time when differences of interpretation might be a problem is
> for someone would be if the person had become attached to a particular
> interpretation to the exclusion of others. For example, if one were to
> fall prey to the temptation to speak of one's interpretation as the
> truth or as a fact, then differing interpretations or opinions might
> pose a problem.

One's interpretation can be true, but limited.  The only problem I see is
the temptation to deny a truth on the grounds that not everybody
recognizes it as such; or the temptation to deny that there is a truth or
truth because there precisely are different interpretations.  The latter
then becomes a positive affirmation that there is a universal truth, and
that truth is that there is no universal truth, that it's simply a matter
of frames, lenses, perspectives.

> You sited alleged visitations from people who had passed on to another
> realm. I merely responded to that by saying that interpreting
> experiences as visitations from another realm is one of many possible
> interpretations of experiences and can therefore not be adduced as
> evidence. If you have no problem with that, then neither of us sees a
> problem here.

I have no problem with this.

> > I think we are dealing with judgments upon insight(s) into given data.
>
> That's what I said. We are dealing entirely with interpretations of
> experiences and opinions as to what those experiences mean.

That is not what I've said.  A judgment is the response to the question
whether something is what it is, and as such regards veracity.  To the
question "What is it?" one makes inquiry, has insights, seeks
understanding, and the like, but until one makes a judgment one is only
ultimately understanding.  Now, if this is what you mean, then we are
simply deaing with different teminologies but actually agree.

> >  One may speak of frames of reference and be
> > engaged in understanding the matter at hand (responding to the question
> > "What is it?"), but sooner or later, if one is to say whether or not that
> > something is what it seems to be, then, one must make a judgment.  Without
> > that judgment one does not know; one simply surmises.  Opinions donot meet
> > this point.
>
> When one thinks one knows and has left surmising behind, then one has
> stopped being wise and started being a fool.

Not necessarily.  One may simply be being responsible and ceasing from
sitting on the fence of indecision.  But it is the mark of wisdom that one
knows one's knowledge is limited.

> > I don't know that I'd agree that we operate entirely on faith, but I can
> > agree that we take many things on some form of faith initially.
>
> When we think we know, what we are really doing is having faith in our
> faith---or in someone else's, whom we assume to be an authority.

Do you mean this to be a comperhensive statement relative to all forms of
knowledge?

Regards,

Stan Ziobro